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Abstract
A Vulnerability Assessment of the East Tennessee State University Administrative
Computer Network
by
James P. Ashe
A three phase audit of East Tennessee State University’s administrative computer
network was conducted during Fall 2001, Spring 2002, and January 2004. Nmap
and Nessus were used to collect the vulnerability data. Analysis discovered an
average of 3.065 critical vulnerabilities per host with a low of 2.377 in Spring 2001
to a high of 3.694 in Fall 2001. The number of unpatched Windows operating
system vulnerabilities, which accounted for over 75% of these critical
vulnerabilities, strongly argues for the need of an automated patch deployment
system for the approximately 3,000 Windows-based systems at ETSU.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
The security of a university’s computing network is important to that
university’s faculty, staff and students. A university’s educational processes are
hindered and its students, and faculty and staff are inconvenienced when
network services or system services become unavailable. In addition, when
networked records are not secured, sensitive information such as personal
student information can be retrieved and made public.
Network security refers to the application of systems security to a
connected network of systems. System security is the incorporation of standard
security measures into computing. Security is defined as measures adopted by
organizations to prevent espionage, sabotage, attack or other crime
[AmHeritage]. According to Farmer and Spafford,
To make a system secure means to protect the information from
disclosure; protecting it from alteration; preventing others from
denying access to the machine, its services and its data; preventing
degradation of services that are present; protecting against
unauthorized changes; and protecting against unauthorized
access [Farmer1].
Attacks upon network security include non-technological threats like
unwarranted physical proximity and sabotage, and technological threats like
Internet worms, hacking, computer viruses, wiretapping, and espionage.
Technological threats can be further categorized as direct network-based
attacks or automated attacks. Direct network-based attacks include attempts
to learn information about a network or gather information stored in a
networked system. Automated attacks include programs or scripts that, once
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released into a networked environment, attack vulnerable systems in that
environment.
This thesis is concerned with the use of security audits to assess the
vulnerability of university computer systems and networks. A security audit
examines systems on a local area network to detect “holes” that may be
exploited by malicious people. Such holes include physical intrusion, abuse of
privilege by legitimate users, and software vulnerabilities.
This work took the form of an investigation of the security of the East
Tennessee State University administrative computer network. Motivated by a
major system compromise, a previous study of the ETSU administrative network
activity sought to determine the types, severity, and number of potential attacks
an academic network would experience over a period of time [Cui]. Over a six
month period between October 2000 and March 2001, a large percentage of
the total incoming network traffic was captured and further analyzed. This
research recorded a range of two-hundred thousand to two million attack
packets per day, involving port scans, denial of service attacks, and various
attempts to exploit known system vulnerabilities. Cui’s research raised the
question that this research attempted to address: ‘If the ETSU network
environment is not protected, and attacks happen daily, what is the state of
ETSU security?’
This research sought to determine the susceptibility of the ETSU
administrative computer network to attack. East Tennessee State University, a
moderate size regional university with approximately 11,250 students and 3,000
staff and faculty, controls a single class B Internet address space
(151.141.0.0/16). Approximately 3,600 Internet addresses on this network are in
active use.
ETSU has two distinct computer networks. One network, which is excluded
from this study, connects student dormitories with one another and the Internet.
Computers on this network, which receive private internet addresses in the
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192.168.x.y range, are only directly reachable by other ETSU student network
systems, and therefore not vulnerable to attacks originating from the ETSU
administrative network or the Internet. The other network, the administrative
network, connects all administrative buildings, computer labs and classrooms
with one another and the Internet. Systems on the ETSU administrative network
are assigned a 151.141.x.y Internet address and are directly accessible by any
computer on the Internet.
The audit was carried out in three phases during the Fall 2001, Spring 2002
and Spring 2004 semesters. A full network audit was conducted during the initial
two phases using the Nmap and Nessus security auditing tools. The third phase
was a partial network scan in Spring 2004 to gauge the degree to which earlier
observations had changed.
Each scan attempted to balance the need to gather data with the need
to accommodate normal network operation. Tests that would have involved
attempted denial of service attacks were avoided. Tests of systems that were
known to have personal firewalls were skipped, to avoid alarming users.
Scans were also done in a way that attempted to account for computer
downtime. Under ideal circumstances, all systems would have remained
connected to the network at all times. This was true of some computer systems,
such as laboratory systems, network equipment and servers. Most systems, such
as administrative workstations, are suspected to be shut down on a nightly basis.
Accordingly, rescans of unreachable hosts were used to increase the chance of
compiling data on all networked hosts.
The key findings of the study found an average host exhibited 3.065
critical vulnerabilities, with a low of 2.377 in Spring 2001 to high a of 3.694 in Fall
2001. Unpatched Windows operating system vulnerabilities were the top
security threat to the ETSU administrative network over this 2½ year span
accounting for over 80% of all critical vulnerabilities. However, an automated
patch management system has yet to be implemented because of concerns
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expressed by the user community over operating system patches ‘breaking’
applications.
The remainder of this thesis is separated into four sections. Section 2,
Related Work, describes the background research performed for this study. This
section also describes the tools used in this study. Section 3, Research
Methodology, describes the motivation for this study, as well as the strategy
used to perform the security audit. Section 4, Data Analysis, examines the data
gathered during the audit. Section 5, Conclusion, includes a summary of the
study’s findings and potential avenues for research.
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Chapter 2
Related Work
The current section reviews tools for detecting security vulnerabilities that
are directly related to work in this study. Section 2.1 discusses the two tools used
in this study, Nmap (Section 2.1.2.1) and Nessus (Section 2.1.2.2).
The remainder of this discussion assumes a fair understanding of Windows
and UNIX networking, the TCP and UDP protocols, network security and different
activities normally placed under the ‘hacking’ umbrella.
2.1. Security Threats and Security Auditing Tools
2.1.1. Security Threats
Security auditing tools were developed to help network and systems
administrators gather information about vulnerabilities in their networked
environment. These vulnerabilities include unauthorized services, system
configuration errors, well-known vulnerabilities and weak user passwords.
Identifying unauthorized services. An unauthorized service is an
unauthorized host program that listens for and accepts connections from other
systems. Legitimate services typically use well-known ports to accept
connections. For example, web servers listen on TCP port 80 and telnet hosts
listen on TCP port 23. A port that is in the ‘listening’ state is referred to as an
open port. Examples of unauthorized services include services running on nonstandard ports, services that respond to user requests in non-standard ways, and
services that are unnecessary for the system being scanned. These can be
detected by scanning a host for all ports actively listening for connection
requests and examining how they process incoming messages.
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Identifying system configuration errors. A system configuration error is a
misconfiguration of a service that leaves the service or system susceptible to
attack. Unset passwords and shared key files are examples of configuration
errors. Operating system installation procedures assign default permissions and
passwords to certain files and accounts. In certain cases, the system default
creates system vulnerabilities. For example, a UNIX password file readable by
the ‘world’ group can be copied and deciphered, compromising the host
system.
Identifying ‘well-known’ vulnerabilities. Well-known system vulnerabilities
are discovered software programming errors or common administrator
oversights that allow a system or network to be compromised. These include
publicly documented instances of buffer overflows and backdoors in
application and operating system software. Finding and patching holes
increases network security by minimizing the infiltration paths an attacker can
use.
Identifying weak user passwords. User passwords that are easy to guess or
crack can allow outsiders to gain network access. Strategies for decreasing the
likelihood of compromised passwords include mandatory policies for password
selection.
2.1.2. Security Auditing Tools
Security auditing tools are utilities that detect vulnerabilities in systems that
could be exploited to compromise a system. The types of vulnerabilities
detected vary with each tool. LC4 (http:///www.atstake.com/lc4) is a tool
created for the sole purpose of testing password strength. Other tools like the IIS
Lockdown Tool (http://www.microsoft.com/windowsserver2003/iis/default.mspx)
test a service for configuration errors and make reparations where necessary.
Tools such as Nessus (http://www.nessus.org) and the Microsoft Baseline Security
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Analyzer (http://www.microsoft.com/technet/security/tools/mbsahome.asp)
check for exploits against a database of well-known attacks. The port-scanning
tool Nmap (http://www.insecure.org) aids in detecting unauthorized services.
Using a combination of tools is the typical way to maximize the number of
detected vulnerabilities in a networked environment.
Nmap and Nessus were chosen for this study, in part, because these tools
can work in conjunction to minimize audit time and maximize the number of
discovered vulnerabilities. Nessus uses a user-configurable database of tests to
drive vulnerability analyses. The Nessus database is updated frequently,
sometimes daily, by the security community, in response to discoveries of new
exploits. Nessus can be configured to use Nmap to determine the open ports
on a system before conducting tests, which allows Nessus to focus solely on
potentially vulnerable ports. Finally, both tools are free to use, and native to
Linux, a free operating system.
2.1.2.1. Nmap
Nmap is a network auditing tool that scans network hosts for open ports.
Port scans can determine if a host is offering errant services or failing to offer
required services. Examples of errant services are an http daemon on a host not
listed as a web server and a backdoor opened by a Trojan horse. Nmap can
also determine the operating system running on a scanned host, and scan
firewalls to determine the ports a firewall effectively filters [Fyodor].
Nmap can scan network hosts using one of six methods: TCP connect()
scans, TCP SYN scans, stealth FIN scans, Xmas tree scans, Null scans, UDP scans,
and ping scans.
The TCP connect() scan, the simplest port scanning method, attempts to
create a TCP connection between the scanning client and the host. The
auditor determines the TCP ports that Nmap will scan. Nmap allows any user to
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execute a TCP connect() scan, regardless of privilege. The TCP connect() scan
is highly traceable by intrusion detection systems, and an unlikely choice of
attackers [Fyodor].
The TCP SYN scan mimics the TCP connect() scan but does not complete
the TCP connection. Nmap sends a SYN (synchronize) packet to the host and
awaits a reply. A RST (reset) packet from the host indicates there are no services
available on the scanned TCP port. An ACK (acknowledgement) packet
indicates a service is available on the scanned TCP port. When the host
receives an ACK packet, Nmap sends a RST packet to destroy the pending
connection. Nmap limits the use of TCP SYN scans to root users, since standard
TCP stacks do not track reset connections [Fyodor].
FIN scans, Xmas tree scans, and null scans use irregular TCP packets to
discover open ports. The TCP header contains a 6-bit control block with six flags:
URG (urgent data), ACK (positive acknowledgement), PSH (push data to
receiver), RST (reset connection), SYN (synchronize), and FIN (finish transfer)
[RFC793]. The Stealth FIN scan sends a FIN packet to the host and awaits a
reply. A closed port that receives a FIN packet should reply with a RST packet as
detailed in RFC 793, reset generation, rule 1:
If the connection does not exist (CLOSED) then a reset is sent in
response to any incoming segment except another reset. In
particular, SYNs addressed to a non-existent connection are
rejected by this means [RFC793].
Ports that fail to reply with an RST packet are assumed to be open.
Xmas Tree scans and Null scans are variations of the Stealth FIN scan. The
Xmas Tree scan sets the FIN, URG and PSH flags. The Null scan turns off all flags n
the 6-bit control block. Stealth FIN, Xmas Tree and Null scans do not work
against some operating systems because of TCP protocol modifications. In
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particular, the Microsoft Windows TCP protocol will not send an RST packet in
response to these scans [Fyodor].
Nmap detects open UDP ports by sending a zero-byte UDP packet to
every host UDP port. If the host replies the port is unreachable, the scanned port
is closed. No response from the host indicates the UDP port is open [Fyodor].
Using a ping scan, Nmap can determine the existence of systems at
specified IP addresses. Nmap ping scans use standard ICMP echo packets and
TCP ACK packets sent to port 80. This feature of Nmap is most useful when
sweeping a network segment to determine the number of hosts on a network
segment. The TCP ACK packet discovers hosts behind a firewall that filters
standard ICMP echo packets. TCP ACK packets will only be sent when a root
user initiates a ping scan [Fyodor].
2.1.2.2. Nessus
Nessus is a UNIX-based security scanner that checks for well-known
vulnerabilities on various platforms. The specific vulnerabilities that Nessus
checks are determined as part of an initial configuration step that involves
choosing the plug-ins of the associated vulnerability that the user wishes to
discover. Tests for vulnerabilities can be created by anyone using the NASL
scripting language. The tool’s authors determine which plug-ins are distributed
with the scanner for use by the Nessus community. Active support from the
open source community has ensured a constantly increasing supply of new,
downloadable, vulnerability tests.
Nessus emulates the first well-known security scanner, the Security
Administrator Tool for Analyzing Networks (SATAN) [Farmer3]. SATAN, like Nessus,
attempts to break into a host to determine the level of host security. Unlike
Nessus, SATAN cannot detect recently discovered vulnerabilities, and was
therefore rejected for this study.
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The Nessus program uses two different executables to scan hosts and
collect data. The ‘server,’ called the Nessus daemon (nessusd), is responsible for
‘attacking’ each host. The Nessus daemon must be executed on a UNIX-based
machine. The ‘client,’ called nessus, collects the data from the attack.
Currently, the client portion of the Nessus program is available for UNIX and
Windows [Deraison1].
The server portion of Nessus supports various options for multiple situations.
Nessus offers multi-user support and the ability to grant different rights to each
user. Multi-user support allows security administrators to grant rights to scan
selected subsets of a network. Nessus can also use multithreading to conduct
concurrent audits. The number of hosts that can effectively be audited
simultaneously is determined by available network bandwidth and the
processing speed of the Nessus daemon computer [Deraison1]. The Nessus
client collects and arranges data received from the vulnerability assessment
[Deraison2].
Nessus offers the following twenty-three families of rule sets for use in a
security audit [Deraison3].
•

Trojan backdoors. Trojan backdoor servers are often distributed through
e-mail as attachments. The unsuspecting recipient executes the infected
program expecting to view something interesting or amusing. Instead, the
attachment installs the Trojan backdoor program onto the system.
Scanning well-known Trojan ports detects the presence of a Trojan
backdoor.

•

CGI script vulnerabilities. A CGI script is a server-side executable. CGI
scripts with programming errors are vulnerable to security flaws. Searching
the UNIX \cgi-bin directory detects possible flawed CGI scripts .

•

Cisco network device vulnerabilities. Nessus, in most cases, uses SNMP to
check the version of the system IOS and compare it to version numbers of
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the Cisco IOS with known vulnerabilities. Use of these plug-ins requires
knowledge of a Cisco device’s read-only SNMP community string. This
group of plug-ins was added to Nessus too late for inclusion in this study .
•

Default UNIX accounts. This rule set tests certain well-known UNIX
accounts for having a default password, or no password at all. This group
of plug-ins was added to Nessus too late for inclusion in this study.

•

Denial of Service (DoS) attacks. This rule set checks for DoS susceptibility in
applications, servers, switches and routers. A denial of service (DoS)
attack is launched by issuing commands that crash the target by means
of ‘confusion’ or buffer overflow. Nessus attempts to crash a host using a
DoS attack to detect software and hardware vulnerabilities.

•

Finger daemon vulnerabilities. The UNIX ‘finger’ command shows user
information. Depending on the daemon’s configuration, the user being
‘fingered’ can belong to a local or remote network. Finger daemons
provide the names of active accounts, which is a security threat by itself.
Some finger daemons have security flaws that offer private information
about users, or allow attackers to gain system control.

•

Firewall configuration errors. This rule set attempts to bypass the firewall
and alerts administrators of subsequent firewall configuration errors.
Malicious parties can ‘hop’ a poorly configured firewall to access network
resources.

•

FTP vulnerabilities. FTP (File Transfer Protocol) servers distribute files to users
with proper credentials. Some FTP servers exhibit flaws that allow
attackers to retrieve arbitrary information or gain control of the system.
Detection of FTP server vulnerabilities involves attempting well-known
exploits.

•

UNIX shell exploits. A UNIX shell accepts user commands for execution.
Shell access is normally reserved for authorized system users. Gaining shell
access allows a user to execute hazardous commands, change a host’s
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configuration and access possibly sensitive data. Not all possible
commands and applications may be executed with just shell access, as
root privileges may be necessary.
•

Remote UNIX root exploits. This rule set tests whether outside parties can
gain root access to a system, and with it, the ability to execute any
command or application, or examine any data file on the exploited host.

•

General. This rule set tests for programs and daemons that provide their
name and version number. Attackers can use this information to
determine if a host might exhibit well-known vulnerabilities. Nessus
attempts to gather operating system and version information from all
queried hosts.

•

Miscellaneous. This rule set checks for blank or default passwords within
daemons and hardware devices. These plug-ins can determine if an
initial password was not changed, or left blank after the daemon or
hardware device installation. When a password is blank or unchanged,
an attacker can gain administrative access to the daemon or hardware
device. The attacker can also change the password to block authorized
users. Nessus will test certain hardware devices and daemons for default
or blank passwords and alert the administrator if needed.

•

Novell Netware vulnerabilities. This group of plug-ins was added to Nessus
too late for inclusion in this study.

•

NIS (Network Information Service) vulnerabilities. The NIS server gathers
information about network services. Systems query the NIS to locate
appropriate network services. NIS servers should not be accessible from
outside of the network. An outsider can obtain a network layout by
querying an easily accessible NIS server. Network layout information will
help an outsider launch an attack with a higher probability of success.

•

Peer-to-peer file sharing. Some well-known peer-to-peer file sharing
programs like Kazaa, Morpheus and Gnutella, if configured incorrectly,
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allow anyone to access a computer’s file system. This group of plug-ins
was added to Nessus too late for inclusion in this study.
•

Nmap port scanning. Nmap was discussed in Section 2.1.2.1.

•

Sensitive file retrieval vulnerabilities. Password file retrieval allows an
attacker to decipher username/password combinations for use in a
consequent break-in. Nessus also uses this rule set’s plug-ins to download
any file with a known path name and file name.

•

Remote Procedure Call (RPC) vulnerabilities. Although most remote
procedure calls do not pose an immediate security threat, unused remote
procedure calls should be disabled in case a vulnerability is discovered in
the future.

•

SMTP server vulnerabilities. An SMTP (Simple Mail Transport Protocol) server
delivers e-mails to their destination. Some tests in this rule set attempt to
crash the SMTP server. Other tests determine if outsiders can use the SMTP
server to send or relay e-mail. Nessus detects and alerts administrators of
these security holes and other undesirable SMTP server settings.

•

Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMP) information disclosure
vulnerabilities. The Simple Network Management Protocol allows
administrators to gather user, service and executing process information.
Nessus issues SNMP queries to obtain private system or network
information.

•

Useless daemons and services. Some useless daemons and services can
be exploited to gain user and network information. Other useless
daemons and services can be exploited to commandeer network
bandwidth.

•

Windows vulnerabilities, including absent hotfixes. As security holes are
detected in Windows operating systems and applications, Microsoft offers
patches, or hotfixes, to alleviate the security threat. Good network
security practices involve actively patching vulnerable software. Nessus
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can detect vulnerabilities that can be patched by applying a hotfix issued
by Microsoft.
•

Windows Access Control List (ACL) enumeration. Determining a
membership of a Windows system ACL can provide a starting point for
launching attacks against privileged account, such as accounts
belonging to Administrators or Domain Administrators. This group of plugins was added to Nessus too late for inclusion in this study.
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Chapter 3
Research Methodology
The study attempted to achieve two goals: first, to try to determine a
‘level’ of vulnerability of the networks systems of a representative regional
university, and to determine the attractiveness of a representative regional
university as a target for exploitation.
East Tennessee State University has approximately 3,600 Internet addresses
in active use by a combination of workstations, servers, hubs, switches, routers,
printers, print servers and other miscellaneous devices, such as personal digital
assistants and wireless access points. Approximately 300 of these network-based
systems were networking devices; approximately 100 printers/print servers; and
the remainder, standard computer systems.
The study described in this thesis was conducted in three scans. The first
two scans featured complete vulnerability checks of the administrative
networks. The first sweep began September 23, 2001 and ended December 3,
2001. The second sweep began January 7, 2002 and ended February 21, 2002.
The third, partial scan, which gathered data from about a quarter of the hosts
on the ETSU network, began January 5, 2004 and ended January 16, 2004.
At the time when the first two scans were conducted, ETSU did not use a
firewall, intrusion detection system or patch management system to protect the
administrative network. At that time, the task of patching system software on
production servers and workstations was the responsibility of systems
administrators and workstation users, respectively. Between the second and
third scan, a firewall solution was implemented.
Data on potential system vulnerabilities during the first two scans was
gathered using Nessus version 1.0.9 through 1.1.13. Nessus plug-ins were
updated every morning to ensure the detection of newly discovered
vulnerabilities. To detect open TCP ports, Nmap version 2.54 beta 30 was used in
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conjunction with Nessus. These programs were hosted on a machine using
RedHat Linux versions 7.1, and 7.2. During the third scan, Nessus version 2.0.7,
Nmap version 3.0 and RedHat Linux version 9.0 were used.
Nessus was used to find well-known exploits on ETSU administrative
network computer systems. Since the ETSU administrative network
predominantly consists of Windows machines, unapplied ‘hotfixes’ were
hypothesized to be the top security threat.
Nmap was used to detect unauthorized services hosted on ETSU
computer systems. Certain open ports immediately show evidence of a
compromised system. For example, a system exhibiting open UDP port 31337 is
infected with the Back Orifice Trojan.
The scans of the ETSU class network, a class B network with approximately
3,600 live addresses, were conducted as a series of scans of class C address
spaces. The ETSU network is logically partitioned into class C virtual LANs, with a
few virtual LANs using two class C address spaces. Each virtual LAN represents a
building on the ETSU campus, or a set of related machines: for example, the
university’s servers, or core routers, or all machines in a particular lab.
Accordingly, systems in any given virtual LAN were expected to exhibit common
traits, such as common software packages, or similar times of deployment.
Each class C address space was scanned twice per semester with an
average of two weeks between scans. The first scan examined all hosts that
were ‘live,’ or available for scanning. The second scan examined hosts with IP
addresses not ‘live’ during the first scan. The class C address spaces were
scanned in the same order during each semester, allowing for a smaller
deviation of mean time between each complete scan of a class C address
space. The number of class C address spaces scanned per day was
determined by the number that could be scanned serially during a four hour
time frame, between 8am and 12pm, on weekdays. Subnets were not scanned
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in parallel because of the limited processing power of the machine used to
gather data.
During the third scan, seven subnets with a 255.255.254.0 subnet mask
were each scanned once. The only hosts that were scanned were those that
were ‘live.’ Each subnet was scanned during a seven hour time frame,
between 9am and 4:30pm on weekdays.
Data was analyzed with a program, nsrparser, which was developed for
this work (see Appendix B). nsrparser returns any of the following information
from a Nessus output file in the Nessus NSR format:
•

Names or IP addresses, and total count of all hosts.

•

Best guess of host operating system by examining the information returned
in specific plug-ins.

•

A listing of all plug-ins, with associated descriptions, that returned
information.

•

All open ports, sorted by number of vulnerabilities exhibited.

•

Names or IP addresses, and total count of hosts with a specific port open.

•

Names or IP addresses, and total count of hosts with vulnerabilities on a
specific port

•

Names or IP addresses, and total count of hosts with warnings on a
specific port

•

Names or IP addresses, and total count of hosts with notes on a specific
port

•

Names or IP addresses, and total count of hosts exhibiting a specific
vulnerability.

•

Names or IP addresses, and total count of hosts exhibiting a specific
warning.

•

Names or IP addresses, and total count of hosts exhibiting a specific note.
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•

Names or IP addresses, and total count of hosts with a specified search
string located in their plug-in description.

•

Names or IP addresses, and total count of hosts with two specified search
strings located in plug-in descriptions for that host.
The versions of Nessus used for the first two scans had an important

limitation: older versions of Nessus catalogued scan data by host IP address and
not by MAC address. Accordingly, any host that changed IP addresses during
the scan might have been scanned twice, or bypassed altogether if the host
changed IP addresses betweens scans that occurred in a single semester. The
standard DHCP lease at the time of the first two scans was three days. The
recent versions of Nessus, since 1.1.14, support the option of cataloging hosts by
MAC address. The option to use MAC addresses for cataloging would have
been used if this cataloging method had been available for the first two scans.
This option was not used during the third scan, as the 512 host subnets were only
scanned once.
Hosts that were live during the first scan of a semester were not tested for
new vulnerabilities by plug-ins downloaded between the two scans. Nessus
does have an option to rescan a host for unchecked vulnerabilities. At the time
of the first two scans, this option was labeled ‘experimental’ and was avoided to
minimize incorrect data.
Hosts that did not reply to a ping were not scanned. Live hosts utilizing a
software firewall such as ZoneAlarm or BlackIce Defender that disallow ping
replies were not scanned. Allowing Nessus to scan a computer running a
software firewall could have disrupted the practices of the system’s user as
ZoneAlarm is normally ‘chatty’ and obtrusive when alerting the system’s user of
potentially malicious activity.

24

Nessus plug-ins that emulated denial of service attacks were disabled so
as not to disrupt a scanned systems operation. Therefore, vulnerabilities related
to some denial of service attacks are absent from the data.
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Chapter 4
Data Analysis
The types of vulnerabilities discussed were separated into three main
categories, local, network, and client. A local vulnerability can only be
exploited through an interactive login of the machine. A remote vulnerability
may be exploited when the susceptible machine is connected to a network.
Client vulnerabilities may be exploited when the subject machine connects to a
malicious host.
Each of these three categories was further separated into five
subcategories, listed in order of increasing severity, based on the end result of a
successful exploit.
•

Information disclosure – A machine offers information about itself, its users
or the network it is connected to that helps malicious parties learn more
about the subject, or other possible subjects.

•

Denial of Service – An exploit renders a service on any machine disabled
or unreachable by authorized clients.

•

Readable Service – An exploit offers read access of a service to an
unauthorized client.

•

Writeable Service – An exploit offers read and/or write access of a service
to an unauthorized client.

•

Privilege Elevation – An exploit grants the malicious party ‘higher’
privileges than a standard guest or user account. In most cases, this refers
to an unauthorized party gaining “root” or “administrator” access.
Based on the availability of the vulnerable service, vulnerabilities were

classified as active and dormant. The term dormant was chosen over inactive
because of the uncertainty that a vulnerable service would be available in the
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future. The term total will refer to the sum of all active and dormant
vulnerabilities.
Nessus categorizes its findings into one of three categories: vulnerability,
warning and info. When referencing these categories, the terms critical
vulnerability, warning, and informational discovery are used to refer to what
Nessus categorizes as a ‘vulnerability’, a ‘warning,’ and an ‘info’, respectively.
4.1. Most Vulnerable Ports
Each of the two initial Nessus scans identified ports 139 (SMB over
NetBIOS), 161 (SNMP), 80 (HTTP), 21 (FTP), and 25 (SMTP) as the five most
vulnerable ports, ordered by number of critical vulnerabilities. The top five
vulnerable ports remained consistent across the two initial scans.
Port 139, used by SMB over NetBIOS, was the most vulnerable port during
both scans. During Fall 2001, the 11,450 port 139 critical vulnerabilities
accounted for 83.3% of the total number of discovered critical vulnerabilities.
During Spring 2002, the 7,042 port 139 critical vulnerabilities accounted for 75.4%
of all discovered critical vulnerabilities. Port 139 vulnerabilities are detailed in
Section 4.1.1.
Port 161, used by SNMP, was the second most vulnerable port during both
scans. All of these critical vulnerabilities were of the information disclosure
variety. The information found from these scans was limited to the ‘default’
SNMP community strings of ‘public’ and ‘private’. During Fall 2001, the 1,391
port 161 critical vulnerabilities accounted for 10.1% of the total number of
discovered critical vulnerabilities. During Spring 2002, the 1,218 port 161 critical
vulnerabilities accounted for 13.0% of the total number of discovered critical
vulnerabilities.
Port 80, used by HTTP servers, was the third most vulnerable port during
both scans. During Fall 2001, eighty different critical vulnerabilities were
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discovered that involved port 80 services. During Spring 2002, the number of
unique critical vulnerabilities fell to sixty-eight. Port 80 vulnerabilities are detailed
in Section 4.1.2.
Port 21, used by FTP daemons, was the fourth most vulnerable port during
both scans. During Fall 2001, the 137 port 21 critical vulnerabilities accounted for
1.0% of the total number of detected critical vulnerabilities. During Spring 2002,
the 193 port 21 critical vulnerabilities accounted for 2.0% of the total number of
discovered critical vulnerabilities. Port 21 vulnerabilities are summarized in
Section 4.1.3.
Port 25, used by SMTP servers, was the fifth most vulnerable port during
both scans. During Fall 2001, the 120 port 25 critical vulnerabilities accounted for
slightly less than 1% of the total number of detected critical vulnerabilities.
During Spring 2002, the 128 port 25 critical vulnerabilities accounted for 1.3% of
the total number of discovered critical vulnerabilities. Port 25 vulnerabilities are
summarized in Section 4.1.4.

28

Top 20 ports by critical vulnerabilities, Fall 2001
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Figure 1. Top twenty ports by critical vulnerabilities, Fall 2001.
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Figure 2. Top twenty ports by critical vulnerabilities, Spring 2002.
Port 1900, used by Universal Plug and Play, showed no critical
vulnerabilities during the Fall 2001 scan, but exhibited eighty-three critical
vulnerabilities, ranked sixth in total critical vulnerabilities during the Spring 2002
scan. This anomaly can be attributed to the discovery of a buffer overflow
vulnerability in the Universal Plug and Play service disclosed December 20, 2001
as outlined in Microsoft Security Bulletin MS01-059.

30

Table 1. Percent change in critical vulnerabilities, Fall 2001 and Spring 2002.
port
all
139
161
80
21
25
1234
631
7070
280
23
8081
1433
5800
443
1900

Fall 2001
13735
11450
1391
257
137
120
32
31
28
28
24
17
10
4
3
0

Spring 2002
9339
7042
1218
230
193
128
49
26
18
18
29
0
10
14
44
83

% change
-32.0
-38.5
-12.4
-10.5
40.9
6.7
53.1
-16.1
-35.7
-35.7
20.8
-100.0
0.0
250.0
1366.7
N/A

4.1.1. Port 139 vulnerabilities
NetBIOS applications employ NetBIOS mechanisms to locate
resources, establish connections, send and receive data with an
application peer, and terminate connections [RFC1001].
Windows machines use NetBIOS services for authentication and service
sharing. The Windows implementation of NetBIOS uses ports 135, 137, 138 and
139. Port 139, the SMB over NetBIOS session port, was the most widely used of
these four ports during the Fall 2001 and Spring 2002 scans.
A NetBIOS null session allows a machine, or a user of that machine, to
gather information about another machine’s users, shares, and services.
Windows processes, for example, use null sessions to browse for network services
and relay the findings to the system’s user. In these service ‘browsing’ sessions, a
username and password is not used. Null sessions can be considered a security
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risk because of the amount of information they can provide about a victim.
However, they are a necessary part of the Windows service architecture. Nessus
uses null sessions to gather information about the host, including local and
domain SIDs, local and domain usernames, file and printer shares and
characteristic information about the local user of the host, such as group
memberships.
Some of the vulnerabilities discovered through scans of port 139 are not
exploitable through a network. Others require a local user account, or the
ability to interact with the machine.
4.1.1.1. Privilege Elevation vulnerabilities
Nine different privilege elevation vulnerabilities were discovered using
information collected from scans of port 139 during both semesters.
A buffer overflow vulnerability in Index Server v2 for Windows NT allows
remote attackers to run code with system privileges. The Spring 2002 scan
showed 515 machines with this vulnerability, down from 1000 machines the
previous semester. The information gathered in the scan fails to show how many
of these systems utilized Index Server v2. Systems running Windows NT and IIS
would have had the greatest probability of running Index Server v2 since both IIS
and Index Server v2 are part of Windows NT Option Pack 1 [MS01-025]. Only a
single machine during this scan, ats.etsu.edu, used Windows NT and IIS and
exhibited this vulnerability. ats.etsu.edu has since been decommissioned.
A vulnerability in the parsing algorithm for IIS versions 4 and 5 could allow
a remote attacker to run code with system privileges [MS00-086]. The Spring
2002 scan showed 158 machines with this vulnerability, down from 338 machines
the previous semester. None of the seventy machines that offered various IIS
services exhibited this vulnerability. In all cases, this vulnerability was classified as
dormant.
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The autologon option in Windows NT based operating systems allows the
administrator to be interactively logged onto the machine with a blank
password. This option would allow a local or remote attacker administrative
access to the machine. Two machines on campus exhibited this active
vulnerability, but have since been reconfigured as the result of one being
compromised on April 2, 2002, detailed in Section 5.1.
All local privilege elevation vulnerabilities are classified as active because
any user that can interactively login to a machine can exploit these
vulnerabilities. Since these vulnerabilities can not be exploited remotely, they
are classified local information disclosure. A legitimate user of ETSU
administrative network system could use this information to determine
exploitable workstations. The following summarizes local privilege elevation
vulnerabilities discovered on the ETSU administrative network:
•

Exploitable flaws exist in certain local procedure call (LPC)
implementations in the Windows NT and 2000 operating systems.
Machines not running Windows 2000 Service Pack 2 and Windows NT
machines not patched after the release of Windows NT Service Pack 6a
are vulnerable (236 machines as of Spring 2002) [MS00-070].

•

Windows NT and Windows 2000 machines not patched against the
‘Relative Shell Path’ vulnerability allow a local user to insert any
executable to be run in place of the Windows ‘explorer’ shell. The
privileges gained by the malicious code would reflect those of the person
interacting with the machine. (236 machines as of Spring 2002) [MS00052].

•

Vulnerabilities in the ‘domain account lockout’ policy of Windows 2000
allow users to brute force passwords, including those of the administrator.
Only machines running Windows 2000 Service Pack 1 are affected [MS00089].
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•

The ‘Still Image’ service, normally used with scanners and digital cameras,
can elevate the privilege of any local user. This service is automatically
installed by Windows 2000 and runs as a service after a digital imaging
device has been attached to the machine. Machines not patched with
Windows 2000 Service Pack 2 are exploitable by this vulnerability (191
machines as of Spring 2002) [MS00-065].

•

A defect in the Service Control Manager within Windows 2000 allows
malicious users to impersonate elevated privilege services. Machines not
patched with Windows 2000 Service Pack 2 are vulnerable (190 machines
as of Spring 2002) [MS00-053].

•

The Windows NT LAN Manager Security Support Provider allows code to
be executed with operating system level rights. Windows NT machines not
patched since Service Pack 6a are susceptible to this exploit (40
machines as of Spring 2002) [MS01-008].

4.1.1.2. Writeable Service vulnerabilities
Five active writeable service vulnerabilities were discovered on TCP port
139 during the scans of the ETSU administrative network. The four vulnerabilities
most often exposed by the scan have many commonalities. The fifth,
uncovered on only two machines, is inherent to Linux, an operating system that
does not natively support the SMB over NetBIOS interface, but can with
packages such as Samba.
The main writeable service vulnerabilities involve Windows registry entries
that can be edited by system users that lack administrative privileges. In all
cases, the registry entries were associated with programs or dynamic link libraries
that execute automatically upon startup/logon. A malicious party that could
edit these entries could cause a program to execute without a legitimate user’s
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knowledge. Spyware and backdoors are examples of programs that could
exploit this vulnerability.
From the data analysis, these vulnerabilities seem to be limited to Windows
NT 4. An attacker with permission to log onto a Windows NT 4 system could edit
these values remotely. Most Windows NT 4 machines on the ETSU administrative
network use a domain login procedure and support no local accounts, except
for those installed by default. The above analysis would suggest that this
vulnerability be classified as local. However, an unsuspecting user could
execute a virus that edits these registry keys to execute the virus’ payload upon
startup. In this scenario, this vulnerability would be classified as client. In this
study, this vulnerability was considered local.
Samba is an open source program developed for various UNIX and Linux
implementations that allows UNIX and Linux machines to interface with Windows
file and printer sharing services. An implementation flaw allows for random
creation of files on the machine using Samba. Fortunately, the files created may
only have the extension ‘.log’, which prevents the overwriting of configuration or
other important files. Two machines on the ETSU administrative network
exhibited this remote writeable service vulnerability.
4.1.1.3. Readable Service vulnerabilities
Five readable service vulnerabilities were identified by the Fall 2001 and
Spring 2002 scans of the ETSU administrative network. The most dangerous of
these vulnerabilities allows for retrieval of information that could be used to gain
complete control over the vulnerable machine.
•

During the Spring 2002 scan, 1832 machines allowed Nessus to login
remotely, either through the use of a valid username/password
combination or through the use of a null session.
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•

1088 machines did not have the registry properly “locked down” and
were accessible to non-administrators

•

110 machines had file or print shares that were accessible to anyone on
the ETSU administrative network.

•

Sixty-seven machines exhibited a vulnerability that allows a password
protected file or print share to be accessed using a special request
containing only the first character of the password [MS00-072].
The most dangerous readable service vulnerability allows a remote user to

access the Windows registry entry containing the password for the VNC service.
Virtual Network Computing (VNC) is a service that allows remote desktop
control similar to Symantec’s pcANYWHERE, Laplink Gold or the Remote Desktop
feature found in Windows XP Professional Edition. An attacker who could read
this registry entry could leverage the information to take complete control of the
victim machine. This vulnerability was found on ten machines during the Fall
2001 scan and seven machines during the Spring 2002 scan.
4.1.1.4. Denial of Service vulnerabilities
A buffer overflow error in the Windows 2000 infrared protocol could cause
the locally exploitable machine to reboot [MS01-046]. A very high percentage
of machines in this study (>99%) probably lack infrared capabilities, leading to a
dormant classification. During the Spring 2002 scan, 478 machines were not
patched to protect against this vulnerability, down from 922 machines the
previous semester.
An implementation error in IP fragment reassembly could cause a
computer to utilize 100% CPU in attempting to recreate a malformed IP packet,
thus denying service to other applications using the CPU [MS00-029]. The Fall
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2001 scan showed 920 machines that could be exploited using this vulnerability.
The Spring 2002 scan showed 237 machines that were vulnerable to this attack.
A vulnerability in the computer browsing protocol of Windows NT and
Windows 2000 machines allows for a malicious machine to become a master
browser and deny service to those services normally indexed by a master
browser [MS00-036]. The Spring 2002 scan discovered 237 machines vulnerable
to this attack. During Fall 2001, 920 systems were vulnerable to this attack.
A deficiency in the “industry-standard” NetBIOS interface allows any
Windows NT or Windows 2000 machine to act as a malicious WINS server,
denying service to services on a victim machine. The malicious machine could
request a victim machine to release its NETBIOS name, rendering the services on
the victim machine unreachable [MS00-047]. 917 machines were vulnerable to
this attack during Fall 2001. 236 were vulnerable to this attack during the Spring
2002 scan.
A remote procedure call (RPC) vulnerability in Windows 2000 machines
allows a malformed RPC request to crash the service, thereby denying access to
the RPC service. Although all Windows 2000 machines are susceptible to this
vulnerability, machines running Windows 2000 Server are at the greatest risk
[MS00-066]. Only four machines of the 190 marked ‘vulnerable’ were
fingerprinted as running Windows 2000 Server, and categorized as machines for
which this vulnerability was active.
A second well-known RPC vulnerability allows an attacker to remove a
victim machine from a domain, leaving it unable to attach to domain resources.
The Microsoft Security Bulletin MS00-062 also states an exploited domain
controller would not allow domain logins, disallowing all domain users from
domain resources. All versions of Windows 2000 Gold are vulnerable except
Windows 2000 Datacenter Server. Machines patched with Windows 2000
Service Pack 1 are immune to this exploit [MS00-062]. As of the Spring 2002 scan,
111 machines were not patched against this vulnerability. Two of these 111
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machines used Windows 2000 Server: neither, however, was a Windows 2000
Datacenter Server system.
A third RPC vulnerability denial of service vulnerability affects only
Windows NT Server based machines. Sending a malformed request to the
service causes the service to halt. Machines not patched since the release of
Windows NT Service Pack 6a are vulnerable to this exploit [MS01-048]. Of the 48
systems that showed evidence of this vulnerability during the Spring 2002 scan,
eleven use Windows NT Server.
Incomplete TCP/IP packets sent to port 139 of vulnerable Windows 9x or
Windows NT machine could cause the victim machine to stop responding to all
network traffic. The Windows 9x machines are only vulnerable if file and printer
sharing is enabled. Windows NT machines are vulnerable if the ‘server’ service is
running, which is active by default [MS00-091]. All forty systems found with this
potential vulnerability during the Spring 2002 scan used a variant of Windows NT.
A programming error in the Windows NT Point-To-Point Tunneling Protocol
(PPTP) causes a memory leak that could be used to exhaust available memory
on the victim machine, rendering all services useless [MS01-009]. Of the forty
machines with this potential vulnerability, none are believed to offer any PPTP
services. Since this vulnerability is not exploitable on any machines attached to
the ETSU administrative network, this vulnerability was classified as dormant.
Windows NT Server and Windows NT Terminal Server are vulnerable to a
local exploit that could cause access to all services to be denied. The
vulnerability allows the malicious user to dominate the usage of the TCP/IP stack,
making it unusable by other services [MS01-003]. Two of the forty machines that
were not patched against this vulnerability use Windows NT Server.
The scan detected exactly one vulnerability in the Fall 2001 scan missing
during the Spring 2002 scan. This vulnerability, when exploited, causes a domain
controller to devote a large percentage of its CPU time to processing
misinformation. During the Fall 2001 scan, 757 machines were potentially
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vulnerable, but none of these 757 machines were domain controllers. This
vulnerability was not discovered during the Spring 2002 scan because the
Microsoft Security Bulletin that originally disclosed information about this
vulnerability was superseded by another Microsoft Security Bulletin, which
caused this plug-in to become obsolete [MS01-011].
4.1.1.5. Information Disclosure vulnerabilities
The following information disclosure vulnerabilities were detected during
the Spring 2002 scan.
•

1,681 machines disclosed information about their native LAN Manager,
operating system and workgroup/domain.

•

1,671 machines disclosed their domain SID.

•

1,579 machines disclosed users of the domain when presented with their
acquired domain SID.

•

1,150 machines allowed remote registry access.

•

348 machines disclosed their browse list of other hosts on the network.

•

299 machines disclosed their host SID.

•

297 machines disclosed users of the host when presented with their
acquired host SID.

•

198 machines disclosed all of their available file and printer shares.

•

191 machines allowed for retrieval of a hashed password through a client
vulnerability for an offline brute-force attack [MS00-067].

•

191 machines were Windows 2000 machines not patched with Service
Pack 2.

•

168 machines disclosed all services currently running on the machine.

•

Eight machines disclosed they were a primary domain controller or a
backup domain controller.
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•

Six machines were Windows NT machines not patched with Service Pack
6a.

4.1.1.6. Port 139 Vulnerabilities summary
Table 2. Summary of port 139 vulnerabilities by classification.

Privilege
elevation
Writeable
service
Readable
service
Denial of
Service
Information
Disclosure

Active &
Remote

Active &
Local

Dormant &
Remote

Dormant &
Local

2

849

673

0

511

0

0

0

3104

0

0

0

861

0

278

518

7787

0

0

0

The most dangerous vulnerabilities are classified as active, remote and
privilege elevation. Two of these vulnerabilities existed in over 3,900 machines
scanned during the Spring 2002 semester. One of these vulnerabilities was
leveraged on April 2, 2002 as described in Section 5.1. Both machines with these
potentially destructive vulnerabilities were administered by the same person,
and their vulnerabilities have since been remedied.

40

4.1.2. Port 80 vulnerabilities
Port 80 is used by the HTTP protocol, mainly in conjunction with web
access. Many different web server software packages are in use on the
Internet, but in an environment where a very large percentage of the systems
use the Windows operating system, it can be assumed that Internet Information
Services (IIS) is the most widely used web server.
Correlations between the operating system in use and the version of IIS
used were used -- Windows NT uses IIS version 4 and Windows 2000 uses IIS
version 5 -- to determine false positives in the collected data. In certain cases, a
vulnerability may have been detected by reading the host registry and
determining that a patch had not been applied. This vulnerability may only be
exploitable through certain versions of IIS.
4.1.2.1. Privilege Elevation vulnerabilities
Forty-six different privilege elevation vulnerabilities were discovered using
information collected from scans of port 80 during both semesters. Only the top
six vulnerabilities are reviewed, since a possible anomaly in Nessus’ analysis of a
host (see Section 4.1.2.6) may have increased the number of reported
vulnerabilities. All data in this section and the following section include the data
recovered and categorized as a possible anomaly.
A buffer overflow vulnerability within the Windows Indexing Service used
by IIS allows remote attackers to run code with system privileges [MS01-033]. The
Spring 2002 scan showed fifty-four machines with this vulnerability, up from forty
machines the previous semester. This vulnerability was the one exploited by the
Code Red worm, launched July 12, 2001. In the Fall 2001 scan, seven machines
exhibited remnants of a Code Red infection, proving this can be classified as an
active and remote vulnerability.
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Forty-six machines exhibited a buffer overflow vulnerability in the Internet
Printing Protocol, installed and activated by default in IIS 5. This vulnerability is
technically similar to the previously discussed Windows Indexing Service
vulnerability, except the exploit uses a different protocol. With the transition to
Windows 2000 from Windows NT, the number of machines that exhibited this
vulnerability nearly doubled from twenty-seven in the Fall 2001 semester. All
machines that exhibited this vulnerability reported as a Windows 2000 Machine
with port 80 available. This vulnerability was classified as active and remote.
A component of the Microsoft Data Access Components contains a
vulnerability that allows code execution, and the ability to read secured files
[MS99-025]. Only IIS 3 and 4 are vulnerable to this exploit, and of the thirty-one
machines labeled by Nessus to be vulnerable, eleven were using Windows NT
and IIS 4.
Social engineering is needed to fully exploit a cross-site scripting
vulnerability that plagued nineteen machines during the Fall 2001 scan. In crosssite scripting, a user of malicious site B is tricked into thinking they are browsing
desired site A. Data entered on site B is passed to site A, along with malicious
code that is unchecked by site A and executed on the users client machine
[Securiteam]. Since this vulnerability takes such elaborate engineering and is
not a readily available exploit, it was classified as dormant and client.
Microsoft offers a tool that hardens an IIS installation that “[turns] off
unnecessary features, thus reducing attack surface available to attackers.”
[Microsoft1] Fifteen machines still exhibited services normally disabled by the IIS
lockdown tool. This number is up from seven machines with this vulnerability
during Fall 2001. Since vulnerabilities were found with these services, this
vulnerability was classified active and remote.
A CGI script associated with SQL administration allows an attacker to send
arbitrary commands to the script’s host system because a variable the script
accepts is not checked for correct syntax. To execute this exploit, the attacker
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must have administrative access to the SQL server. However, there is a wellknown exploit in which the default administrator account for the SQL server, the
‘sa’ account, is created with a blank password. A combination of a blank ‘sa’
password and this CGI makes the system vulnerable to a remote exploit. Since
none of the systems checked had a blank ‘sa’ password this vulnerability was
classified as dormant. Nine systems during the Spring 2002 scan showed the
availability of this CGI, down from fourteen the previous semester.
Findings concerning other privilege elevation vulnerabilities and those
listed above are summarized in Section 4.1.2.7.
4.1.2.2. Writeable Service vulnerabilities
Eight different writeable service vulnerabilities were discovered during the
Spring 2002 scan. Only the top two of these vulnerabilities are reviewed
because of the Nessus anomaly.
A web-accessible executable for IIS version 3 named ‘newdsn’ allows an
attacker to create arbitrary files on the vulnerable host. The ‘newdsn’ script, like
any web-accessible sample executable or script, should be removed in a
production environment. Removing vulnerable sample applications is one
purpose of the IIS Lockdown Tool discussed in the previous section. Five systems
during the Spring 2002 scan were potentially vulnerable to this exploit. Since
three of these systems used the Windows NT 4 operating system, this may be
classified as an active and remote vulnerability [xforce3].
A Sambar web server allows an attacker to use a Perl script for sending email without proper credentials. This was classified as a writeable service
vulnerability because it allows the attacker to use the service in an undesired
manner, but does not allow for an elevation of privileges. Because none of the
servers involved truly used the Sambar web server, this has been classified as a
dormant remote vulnerability.
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4.1.2.3. Readable Service vulnerabilities
Sixteen different readable service vulnerabilities were discovered during
the Spring 2002 scan, of which only the top three vulnerabilities are reviewed.
IIS versions 4 and 5 include an administration page that allows any user to
change their domain password by entering the account name and current
password. This page and its password change option may be accessed
repeatedly without the attacker being locked out. Therefore, the attacker
could be able to discern a password by brute force. Twenty systems, all using
the Windows NT4 or Windows 2000 server operating systems, had this
administration page available to the anonymous browser. Twelve systems had
this administration page available during the Fall 2001 scan. This vulnerability
was classified as active and remote.
Twelve systems running IIS had a sample application installed with a
vulnerability that allows an attacker to list the contents of any directory on a
server; nine more than the previous semester. This sample application would
normally be removed when the IIS lockdown tool was used to harden the web
service. This vulnerability was also classified as active and remote.
Four systems running IIS were configured to support unrestricted
administrative access from remote websites. This allows attackers that know or
can decipher the username and password of an IIS administrator to use the
administration applications. Since these administration pages can be reached
from remote machines, and the URLs of these pages are well known, this was
classified as an active vulnerability.
4.1.2.4. Denial of Service vulnerabilities
Six vulnerabilities, when exploited, would deny access to a system service.
Two of these are examined in this section. The remaining vulnerabilities are not
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reviewed because of the possible anomaly that may have skewed the count of
total vulnerabilities.
The first vulnerability was labeled by Nessus as a denial of service
vulnerability, but the description given by Nessus was too vague for further
analysis:
It may be possible to make the web server execute arbitrary code
or crash by sending it a too authorization. Risk factor: High
Of the seventeen devices listed with this vulnerability, fifteen of them were
a variety of print device. The remaining two were MacOS platforms. One of
these two systems was a known web server. The other system, whose IP address
did not resolve to a hostname, was probably not an advertised web server.
Since this vulnerability could not be studied, but was reported by Nessus, it was
categorized as a remote, dormant vulnerability.
A vulnerability discovered on four systems causes a denial of service to the
web server when exploited.
A denial of service vulnerability (exists) that could enable an
attacker to temporarily disrupt service on an IIS 5.0 web server.
WebDAV doesn’t correctly handle particular type of very long,
invalid request. Such a request would cause the IIS 5.0 service to fail
[MS01-044].
This vulnerability can be categorized as an active, remote vulnerability.
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4.1.2.5. Information Disclosure vulnerabilities
The following information about machines on the ETSU administrative
network was determined during the Spring 2002 scan.
•

174 machines advertised their web server software and version number.

•

Fifty-three machines used Microsoft FrontPage Extensions.

•

Twenty-one machines had FrontPage related, world-readable files that
contain server configuration information.

•

Eighteen machines had a robots.txt file that contains information about
the web site directory structure.

•

Fourteen machines used a version of Perl that returns the directory of the
virtual web server when confronted with a request to a non-existent Perl
script.

•

Ten machines using Apache would have disclose legitimate usernames of
system users.

•

Four machines offered an IIS administration file which would have allowed
anyone to view the directory structure of the machine.

•

Three machines used a CGI script that returns environment variables

4.1.2.6. Port 80 anomalies
Data from security audits should be verified when possible since tools like
Nessus may generate false positives or fail to detect existing vulnerabilities. The
author of this study lacked the authority to verify the data reported from Nessus
and relied largely on the tool’s ability to validate the data, and the plausibility of
the data. One implausible situation involved a system named forbesm.etsu.edu
that allegedly exhibited forty-five different port 80 vulnerabilities. In many cases,
this system was the only system to display any of these vulnerabilities. The
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validity of the scan was investigated by attempting to exploit some of the
readable service vulnerabilities using information returned by Nessus plug-ins.
None of the attempted exploits resulted in a positive result. Although it could
not be determined if all detected vulnerabilities were false positives for reasons
of web server integrity, it seemed ‘likely’ that most (>90%) of the Nessus reported
data on this system was false.
Since no other anomalies were discovered during the analysis phase of
this study, the author regards all other data from Nessus as reliable.
4.1.2.7. Port 80 Vulnerabilities Summary
Table 3. Summary of port 80 total vulnerabilities by classification.

Privilege
elevation
Writeable
service
Readable
service
Denial of
Service
Information
Disclosure

Active &
Remote

Active &
Local

Dormant &
Remote

Dormant &
Local

202

0

49

0

28

0

5

0

55

0

0

0

8

0

17

0

314

0

0

0

During the Fall 2001 scan Nessus discovered 164 critical vulnerabilities, 171
warnings and 174 informational discoveries that have been categorized above.
4.1.3. Port 21 Vulnerabilities
Port 21, is the TCP port most widely used by File Transfer Protocol (FTP).
During the Spring 2002 scan, 189 devices had services available on port 21.
Eleven different vulnerabilities were discovered, all of the remote and active
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variety. Sixty-nine of the vulnerabilities allowed for some type of privilege
elevation. No vulnerabilities were discovered that allowed an attacker to
upload files to arbitrary locations on the FTP site. Eighty-four vulnerabilities were
discovered that allowed anonymous users to browse the FTP site. No
vulnerabilities that would disclose information about the system were
discovered.
The most notable of these vulnerabilities were the eighty-four
vulnerabilities related to anonymous FTP access. Nmap operating system
fingerprint data showed all of the devices to be IP printers or print server devices.
No file data is stored on any of these devices. It is unknown what the FTP
services on these machines are used for. These systems probably receive print
data on port 21, or use this port for downloading firmware or software systems
upgrades.
In fifteen cases, a vulnerability in the Washington University FTP daemon
that is found on many Linux distributions allows an attacker with a valid account
or anonymous access to exploit the vulnerability to run arbitrary code as root.
This vulnerability was found on seven Linux systems, five AIX systems and one
Solaris system. Two print devices were also listed as having this vulnerability.
None of the systems with the vulnerability allowed anonymous access. If it was
assumed that the FTP servers had at least one standard user on them, then the
server could be considered active against this remote exploit [xforce1].
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Table 4. Summary of Port 21 vulnerabilities by classification.
Active &
Remote

Active &
Local

Dormant &
Remote

Dormant &
Local

69

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

84

0

0

0

42

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

Privilege
elevation
Writeable
service
Readable
service
Denial of
Service
Information
Disclosure

4.1.4. Port 25 vulnerabilities
Port 25 is most widely used by the Simple Mail Transport Protocol (SMTP) for
sending electronic mail. During the Spring 2002 scan, seventy-two devices had
services available on port 25. Twelve of the vulnerabilities allowed for an
elevation in privileges. Eleven of these vulnerabilities, however, required an
interactive session with the system. Thirty-one vulnerabilities allowed for an
attacker to use the service for writing. Fifty-two vulnerabilities allowed for
information disclosure.
The single remote, active privilege elevation vulnerability was discovered
on an AIX system. The Nessus plug-in information states that a HELO command
with an argument over 12,000 characters causes a buffer overflow that can
allow arbitrary code execution. The remainder of the privilege elevation
vulnerabilities can only be exploited from the local host since the buffer overflow
that causes the vulnerability involves the processing of the sendmail ‘–bt’ switch
argument.
The writable service vulnerability discovered allows the attacker to write
arbitrary files to the SMTP server system by forging the receipt field with an
absolute file path and file name. The SMTP server does not validate the
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information in this fieldreceipts. The Nessus plug-in warns that this information
could be a false positive because of the ways in which different mail servers
react to such a request. Some servers respond positively, while others may
ignore the message without notifying the sender. To verify the validity of each
reported vulnerability would require file system access.
The information disclosure vulnerabilities were “banner” responses that
allow the attacker to retrieve the name and sometimes the version of the mail
server being used. The attacker could use this information to see if well-known
vulnerabilities exist for the server being examined.
Table 5. Summary of port 25 vulnerabilities by classification.

Privilege
elevation
Writeable
service
Readable
service
Denial of
Service
Information
Disclosure

Active &
Remote

Active &
Local

Dormant &
Remote

Dormant &
Local

1

11

0

0

31

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

52

0

0

0

4.2. Spring 2004 and Spring 2002
Since the initial scan during the Fall 2001 and Spring 2002 semesters, and
the follow-up scan during the Spring 2004 semester, there was one major
change to the ETSU administrative network. A firewall protecting the entire
campus administrative network from the Internet was implemented. Almost all
(>99%) of the 65,535 TCP ports are blocked globally, and requests for open ports
in the firewall to a single host must be registered. This change has helped
reduce the vulnerabilitiy of the campus network to outside attacks. However, if
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an attacker has availability to the ETSU administrative network, their attacks will
not be stopped by a firewall or intrusion detection system.
The administrative network’s vulnerability to internal attack was exposed
in 2003 when an ETSU employee inadvertently plugged a laptop infected with
the MSBlast worm into the ETSU administrative network. Since ETSU does not
automate their management of patching systems, the worm penetrated a
significant portion of the network, disrupting services, and, at its peak, passing
more than 50,000 infected messages a day through the ETSU mail server.
A final partial sweep of the ETSU administrative network conducted during
the Spring semester of 2004 scanned 909 of the estimated 3,600 hosts. This scan
was expected to show similar numbers in the number of critical vulnerabilities
per host, and the number of critical vulnerabilities per port. Once the analysis of
the data was completed, it was discovered that the number of critical
vulnerabilities per host increased, whereas the top three vulnerable ports
registered zero critical vulnerabilities during the Spring 2002 audit.
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4.2.1. Spring 2004 Summary
Top 20 ports by critical vulnerabilities, Spring 2004
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Figure 3. Top twenty ports by critical vulnerabilities, Spring 2004.
Port 445, the port most widely used by SMB over TCP/IP, exhibited the most
vulnerabilities during the Spring 2004 semester. Port 8083 vulnerabilities which
numbered 506 during the Spring 2004 semester are discussed in the following
section. The NetBIOS RPC end point mapper, port 135, rose to the third most
vulnerable port. The next four most vulnerable ports were all in the top five most
vulnerable during the 2002 scan: 80 (HTTP), 161 (SNMP), 21 (FTP), and SMB over
NetBIOS (139).
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4.2.1.1. Port 8083
Port 8083 is a non-standard port chosen for use by the McAfee Framework
Service. ETSU uses this service to deploy and manage the McAfee VirusScan
Enterprise product on ETSU workstations using ePolicy Orchestrator as its
centralized console. Five different vulnerabilities were discovered during the
Spring 2004 scan.
One of these port 8083 vulnerabilities was related to a buffer overflow in a
.dll used by FrontPage Extensions. This vulnerability was only discovered on three
machines using a Windows operating system. It is hypothesized that the systems
in question used another software package that also used port 8083.
A second port 8083 vulnerability can be exploited utilizing an unchecked
buffer in one of the core operating system components in Windows 2000 and
Windows XP. To exploit this vulnerability, the vulnerable system must be using IIS
version 5 or 6. This vulnerability allows the attacker to run arbitrary code. Only
one Windows XP machine was located with this vulnerability [MS03-007].
The remaining three vulnerabilities involve a directory traversal
vulnerability. To exploit this vulnerability, a client sends a correctly formulated
request to a server that contains character sequences normally reserved for
changing directories, such as ‘../’. Hosts that are vulnerable to this exploit allow
these requests to access directories outside the scope of the available web
root. The exploit allows an attacker to access directories normally denied
access to anonymous web browsers.
Through testing, it was determined that the ePolicy Orchestrator Agent
(ePOAgent) client is susceptible to a simple directory traversal exploit using ‘…/’
as the character sequence to access a parent directory. The ETSU configuration
for this service places the home directory for these services six folders below the
root folder of the system partition. The attacker can retrieve a file by forming a
request that begins with ‘http//hostname:8083/…/…/…/…/…/…/’ and
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appending the directories and name of a known any file. The files available to
the attacker are any files that are not hidden and readable by the NTFS
‘everyone’ group. This exploit can only read the system partition, and can not
access other partitions. Also, the exact name and location of the file must be
known since this attack method does not offer directory listings. A quick Internet
search uncovered no information regarding this vulnerability. One listing on the
ISS X-Force database had an entry that was similar to the exploit described
above:
McAfee AsaP VirusScan is a Web-based AntiVirus service for remote
clients that uses the myCIO HTTP server to transfer virus definitions.
McAfee AsaP VirusScan could allow a remote attacker to traverse
directories on the Web server. A remote attacker can send a
specially-crafted URL request containing modified "dot dot"
sequences that use three dots instead of two (/.../) to traverse
directories and view or download any file outside of the Web root
directory. [xforce2]
Although developed by the same company, these two products are
marketed separately.
At the time of this writing it was unclear if Network Associates Incorporated
was notified about this vulnerability in their enterprise level virus protection
product.
4.2.2. Spring 2004 and Spring 2002 comparison
To compensate for the Spring 2004 semester partial scan, the number of
vulnerabilities per port was adjusted by a common multiplier (hosts scanned
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during Spring 2002 / hosts scanned during Spring 2004) to estimate the total
number of detectable vulnerabilities.
Table 6. Percent change in critical vulnerabilities, Spring 2002 and Spring 2004.

port
all
445
8083
135
80
161
21
139
631
443
25
280
22
3339
5225
6112

Spring 2002
9311
0
0
0
202
1218
193
7042
26
44
128
18
7
0
0
8

Spring 2004
adjusted
(x4.309)
13613
2960
2180
1400
767
508
414
151
125
112
103
90
73
73
60
56

Spring
2004
3159
687
506
325
178
118
96
35
29
26
24
21
17
17
14
13

difference
(adjusted)
4302
2960
2180
1400
565
-710
221
-6891
99
68
-25
72
66
73
60
48

% change
(adjusted)
46.2
N/A
N/A
N/A
279.7
-58.3
114.3
-97.9
380.6
154.6
-19.2
402.7
946.5
N/A
N/A
600.2

The number of vulnerabilities increased 46.2% between the time period of
Spring 2002 and Spring 2004. The number of vulnerabilities during the Spring 2004
scan was at a level similar to Fall 2001.
The order of the most vulnerable ports between the two scans changed
significantly. Port 139 was the most vulnerable port in the 2002 scan showing
7,042 discovered abilities. In the Spring 2004 scan, it ranked seventh, showing
only 151 vulnerabilities. The most vulnerable port during the most recent scan
was port 445, which had a total of 2,960 vulnerabilities. During the second scan,
this port registered zero vulnerabilities. This change can be attributed to a
change in the SMB communications architecture starting in Windows 2000. SMB
is an acronym for ‘server message block’ and is described as “a message
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format used by DOS and Windows to share files, directories and devices”
[Webopedia]. In versions of Windows previous to Windows 2000, SMB was
partnered with the NetBIOS protocol for communication purposes. This
communication used TCP port 139. Since Windows 2000, NetBIOS was no longer
used to transmit SMB information; the server message blocks were transmitted
using the TCP/IP protocol. Nessus data indicated that only systems running the
Windows 9x operating systems and some Linux systems, assumed to be running
Samba, have vulnerabilities on port 135. All machines that reported
vulnerabilities on port 445 were either Windows 2000 professional or Windows XP.
Port 135, used by the Windows RPC end point mapper, was the third most
vulnerable port during the Spring 2004 scan. Remote Procedure Call is a
protocol that supports the remote execution of code on a host system. Port 135
is consistently at the top of the most attacked ports, as reported by the Internet
Storm Center, a service run by the SANS Institute that receives and analyzes logs
from millions of intrusion detection systems. The MS03-026 Microsoft security
advisory warned of a buffer overflow in the RPC interface that could allow
arbitrary code execution [MS03-026]. This vulnerability was exploited by the
MSBlast worm. It is theorized that the steadily decreasing level of port 135
attacks from unique sources is related to the discovery and cleansing of this
worm.
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Figure 4. Top attacked ports per day by number of distinct attack sources.
(source: Internet Storm Center – http://www.incidents.org, January 30, 2004)
Port 80 vulnerabilities increased by 279.7% from Spring 2002 to Spring 2004.
The vulnerabilities were detected in systems running various Windows operating
systems, Linux operating systems and print devices. Sixty-two different
vulnerabilities were discovered on the 89 machines that reported a port 80
vulnerability. The class C subnet that contains the main campus web servers
was not scanned during this third scan, and therefore the 178 vulnerabilities
Nessus discovered during the Spring 2004 scan were on systems running possible
unauthorized services.
SNMP information disclosure vulnerabilities dropped by 58.3% between the
Spring 2002 and Spring 2004 scans. FTP vulnerabilities increased 114.3% during
the two year span.
The number of average critical vulnerabilities, warnings and informational
discoveries per host found by Nessus increased between the Spring 2002 and
Spring 2004 semesters. The average number of critical vulnerabilities per host
rose 46.1% from 2.377 average critical vulnerabilities to 3.475 average critical
vulnerabilities. The average number of warnings per host rose 46.1% from 6.682
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average warnings to 9.764 average warnings. The average number of
information discoveries per host rose 16.3% from 8.832 average informational
discoveries to 10.273 average informational discoveries.
Table 7. Average vulnerabilities by type, Fall 2001, Spring 2002 and Spring 2004.

critical
vulnerabilities
avg. critical /
host
warnings
avg. warn. /
host
informational
disclosure
avg. info /
host

Fall 2001

Spring 2002

Spring 2004

Total

13642

9311

3159

26112

3.694

2.377

3.475

3.065

18588

26176

8876

53640

5.033

6.682

9.764

6.043

30828

34597

9339

74764

8.347

8.832

10.273

8.776
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Chapter 5
Conclusion
5.1. Conclusions
Unpatched Windows operating system vulnerabilities are the top threat to
security on the ETSU administrative network. Port 139 critical vulnerabilities
accounted for 80.1% of all critical vulnerabilities discovered during the initial two
scans. The major problem facing campus security is the absence of a patch
management and deployment system for the over 3,000 Windows based
computer systems. Under the current security model, users are responsible for
applying operating system and application patches to their workstation.
Attempts for the Office of Information Technology to automate patch
distribution to workstations have been squelched by members of the faculty
community. Concerns exist that automated patch installation may disable
specialized programs that are installed and used on faculty workstations.
Allowing ‘academic freedom’ grants liberties to workstation users at ETSU
that do not follow preferred security guidelines. Users are made a local
administrator on their primary workstation and may install any program, or run
any executable. Users commonly make unwise choices such as installing
programs laced with spyware or running unknown executables received
through e-mail. The network is also open to anyone with access to a network
jack, and systems that are not members of the ETSU domain can receive an IP
address and access ETSU resources and the Internet. The ETSU firewall protects
against exploits by outside sources, but when an infected source enters the ETSU
network, the probability that the network could suffer a large number of
compromises increases.
In some cases, server class operating systems are installed on workstations
and server class hardware not administered by the Office of Information
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Technology. On April 2, 2002, a Windows NT server was compromised and
turned into a web server of pornographic material. The intruders were able to
compromise this Windows NT Server because the administrator password was
left blank. On April 4, 2002, a Windows 2000 machine was compromised and
turned into a ‘warez’ server holding applications, games and pornographic
movies. The administrator password on this machine was also left blank. On
April 14, 2002, a machine was used as a mail server to send out e-mails
advertising pornography. The network readable SMTP service allowed
anonymous relaying of e-mail and was used by the intruders to send over 23,000
solicitations. The machine was configured to offload the duty of sending the
mail to the former ETSU mail server, access.etsu.edu. Under the unusual load of
outgoing e-mail, and the 13,000 solicitations that were ‘bounced back,’ access
folded and denied service to ETSU faculty, staff and students.
Systems such as ats.etsu.edu, mentioned in Section 4.1.1.1, and the three
systems mentioned here illustrate how allowing university employees to
administer their workstations or servers has decreased the security on the ETSU
administrative network. Changing this policy of open administration would be
difficult and may not be desired in an educational environment. Security
policies set by an information technology department, foremost, should not
interfere with this educational mission. However, until security policies are
developed and enforced, it is theorized that the number of vulnerabilities will
remain consistent with the data discovered in this study.
Continued security audits at ETSU would not be practical until a system for
patch deployment was implemented. The analysis found most of the critical
vulnerabilities (>75%) were related to Windows operating systems being
unpatched or misconfigured. Without a patch deployment system to create a
security baseline, an audit would only discover the obvious; that operating
system patches were missing on many systems.
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5.2. Avenues for Research
5.2.1. ETSU Domain Password Policy
East Tennessee State University does not enforce a strict password policy
on the ETSU Windows 2000 Active Directory Domain. The current policy allows
for any password that is at least six characters in length and may consist of any
combinations of letters, numbers or symbols. A user’s password must be
changed once every ninety days, and the same password can not be used
twice in succession. A possible extension of this thesis would involve using the
LC4 program described in the following section to analyze the passwords used
on the ETSU domain to determine the exploitability or ‘crackability’ or these
passwords. From this information, it could be determined if a stricter password
policy for the domain should be suggested.
5.2.1.1 LC4
LC4 is a Windows-based utility that evaluates the strength of Windows user
account passwords. Password strength is determined by the time it takes a third
party to guess or decipher a user password. A password easy for an attacker to
guess or decipher increases network vulnerability. Weak passwords are
generally common words, names of people or pets, birthdays, and passwords six
characters or less in length. Strong passwords are generally eight characters or
longer in length, and contain a combination of letters, numbers and symbols.
LC4 can only decipher passwords used in Windows NT/2000 network
environments [LC4].
LC4 first must gather the encrypted passwords before the (sometimes
long) deciphering process. LC4 can retrieve encrypted passwords in from a
local registry; from a remote registry; from a SAM file; and through sniffing.
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Administrative rights are required for many encrypted password retrieval tasks,
for obvious security reasons.
LC4 can ‘dump’ passwords from the local machine registry. LC4 will not
retrieve locally stored password hashes if a non-privileged user makes the
‘dump’ request.
Encrypted passwords may also be retrieved from a remote computer
registry. The user requesting the retrieval must have administrative rights on the
host machine. To retrieve remote password hashes, the host machine must
allow remote registry access also. If the remote machine protects the
encrypted passwords with Microsoft SYSKEY (Windows NT 4.0 SP3 and later), a
utility exists that can be used to bypass SYSKEY encryption and retrieve the
encrypted passwords for use by LC4 [LC4].
Passwords can be retrieved from a ‘SAM file.’ The SAM file is a database
of encrypted passwords held by the Security Account Manager of Windows NT
based systems [Microsoft3]. A SAM file can only be retrieved in specific ways
since the Security Account Manager holds a lock on the SAM file. The first way
to retrieve a SAM file involves booting the system from a floppy disk that
contains DOS or a DOS-based version of Windows. On this boot disk, a utility to
view NTFS partitions under DOS must exist. The SAM file may be copied since the
SAM file is not locked in DOS. Second, Windows NT 4 systems store the SAM file
on repair disks and the WINNT\repair directory. The SAM file, lastly, can be
recovered from a backup tape [LC4].
The final method of password retrieval is ‘sniffing’ and collecting network
packets that contain encrypted passwords. Sniffing network packets with LC4
requires a packet capture driver to be installed. A computer on an unswitched
network will receive packets destined for all systems attached to a common
hub, section of network or broadcast domain. The network interface device
normally discards packets destined for other machines. A packet capture driver
accepts all packets received by the network interface device [LC4].
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LC4 attempts to decipher a password using a four phase algorithm [LC4]:
•

Test the password for equality with the username.

•

Test the password against common words or alphanumeric combinations.
The newest release of LC4 contains a smaller dictionary of approximately
twenty-five thousand words and a larger dictionary of approximately twohundred fifty thousand words.

•

Test the password against combinations of dictionary words with different
combinations of numeric and symbolic characters. The default setting
appends two non-alphabetic characters to the end of each dictionary
word. The ‘hybrid’ phase deciphers such passwords as ‘apple50’ and
‘secret!!’.

•

Attempt a brute force attempt of all character combinations. The brute
force phase of decryption will take the longest, in some cases in excess of
twenty-four or forty-eight hours.
Password strength can be measured by the time needed to decipher a

password. LC4 lists the audit time for each deciphered password. If desired, the
deciphered password may remain hidden [LC4].
Windows NT passwords can be brute-forced by LC4 in two pieces.
Windows NT has a password character-length limit of fourteen characters. The
encryption methods employed by Windows NT allow the password to be
decrypted in two seven-character segments. Decrypting two seven-character
password fragments is far faster than decrypting one fourteen-character
password. Windows 2000 sets no limit on password length. Passwords fifteen
characters or longer must be deciphered in full [LC4].
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Figure 5. LC4 (not reporting cracked password).
LC4 could be used to determine the average strength of ETSU user
passwords. With the absence of a password policy, a large percentage of user
passwords (30%) are expected to be deciphered in the first three deciphering
phases.
5.2.2. Software Update Services
East Tennessee State University does not use a software package for the
automated delivery of system patches to Windows workstations and servers on
the ETSU administrative network. One such software package for delivering
system patches is Microsoft Software Update Services. Software Update Services
(SUS) is a tool that allows domain administrators to control the ‘Automatic

64

Updates’ control panel object of Windows 2000, Windows XP and Windows
Server 2003 systems on their domain.
A Software Update Services server is deployed on a site to be used as the
repository for all workstations and servers use to receive critical updates. The
critical updates are cached locally on the SUS server through a synchronization
process with windowsupdate.microsoft.com. Once the update is downloaded
and accepted for distribution by the administrator, the ‘Automatic Updates’
object within the client operating system is directed to process the update
through the SUS server.
An active directory group policy controls how the Automatic Updates
client processes updates. SUS supports for three options for managing updates.
The first option notifies the user of a patch’s availability and requires user
intervention to both download the update from the SUS server and to install the
patch. The second option downloads the patch automatically to the client
system, but will not attempt to install it without user intervention. The third choice
forces the Automatic Updates client to automatically download and install the
update. If the final choice is chosen, the administrator chooses the time at
which the patch installation occurs. Supplementary options exist that allow for
an administrator to handle situations where a system was powered down during
a scheduled installation time, and situations where a user is interactively logged
into a machine during a scheduled installation time.
Currently, a Software Update Services server is being tested at ETSU for use
on the administrative network. However, global use of the server has been
denied by committees that are concerned about the automatic patching of
systems causing changes that could disable certain software packages. An
extension of this thesis could involve studying the risks and rewards of
automatically patching system software on an enterprise level.
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5.2.3. Systems Management Server
Microsoft Systems Management Server allows administration of an entire
network from a centralized point. Deploying updates, new software, and on-site
troubleshooting can be costly, in terms of money and labor, especially with a
large number of systems. Rolling out a new software program normally involves
a privileged user visiting each system and manually installing the software
package, or allowing the user of the system to have administrative access over
their system. Deploying a system-wide software update, such as a service pack,
involves similar labor. Systems Management Server allows administrators to
deploy software and updates without visiting each system [Microsoft2].
Systems Management Server maintains an inventory of hardware devices
in a SQL database. Knowledge of hardware devices helps to develop plans to
upgrade software and hardware for older machines. Hardware inventory aids
troubleshooting cases where certain devices with known ‘problem’ software
can be updated to a newer and less problematic software package. Systems
Management Server can eliminate human error in inventory upkeep. Using SQL,
administrators can query the hardware device database for desired hardware
characteristics [Microsoft2].
Systems Management Server maintains an inventory of software
programs. It is possible to query a listing of software packages installed on a
system, or a listing of all systems with a specific software package installed.
When the number of software licenses for an application is limited, Systems
Management Server can detect the number of loaned licenses and block users
from exceeding the license limit [Microsoft2].
Administrators can control clients remotely using SMS remote desktop
abilities to determine, and remedy problems encountered by a user. Systems
Management Server allows for full or partial control of a remote client
[Microsoft2].
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5.2.3.1. Inventory
Systems Management Server gathers data about network resources
during ‘discovery’ events. First, Systems Management Server gathers information
about a computer system when the system is added to an SMS ‘site.’ A ‘site’ in
SMS can refer to any logical partitioning of resources, including an entire
enterprise or a single subnet. Second, SMS can gather information from a DHCP
server to discover systems that are not present on the network at a given time.
Third, different logon methods into Novell NetWare systems can trigger Systems
Management Server to gather information. Finally, SMS periodically checks
known resources for updates. SMS polls computer systems that do not regularly
activate conventional discovery triggers, such as systems that are infrequently
rebooted, to keep its information about these resources current [Microsoft2].
After a resource is discovered, the Systems Management Server client is
automatically installed on the newly discovered resource. The SMS client
software then collects resource data collection and transfers it to the Systems
Management Server upon request. The software tracks data on more than 200
different attributes of each resource system. Client attributes tracked are
reminiscent of data listed by the Windows Device Manager and Windows
System Information. The Windows Device Manager lists hardware devices, such
as drives, video and network adapters, disk controllers, ports and other
peripherals. Microsoft System Information lists hardware device attributes like
processor speed, amount of memory, operating system, and computer
manufacturer, as well as hardware resources, such as memory address and
interrupt requests.
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Figure 6. Microsoft System Information MMC snap-in
If a system’s hardware configuration is changed, only changes and not
the complete hardware inventory are transmitted to the Systems Management
Server. Transmitting only changes saves bandwidth on slower connections and
reduces overhead on the Systems Management Server. The SMS client installed
on each resource system collects the amendment data [Microsoft2].
The SMS client performs a software inventory in a similar manner to a
hardware inventory. The client searches the system for installed software and
transmits the compiled list to the Systems Management Server [Microsoft2].
In addition to cataloguing software applications installed on each
resource system, Systems Management Server can restrict access to certain
applications based on user, time and usage. For example, an administrator can
block access to Solitaire on all systems during normal business hours. Also,
administrators can also deny access to certain applications with limited licenses.
A user wishing to use an application with all available licenses loaned enters a
line for a ‘callback’ when a license becomes free for use. Mobile users can also
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check out a license for the use of a program on a laptop computer so the
mobile user can execute the problem disconnected from the network without
exceeding available software licenses [Microsoft2].
5.2.3.2. Deployment
Deployment of a single application or application update over a network
of hundreds or thousands of systems is time consuming and very costly. Systems
Management Server can ease a ‘rollout’ of an application or an update over a
network by eliminating the ‘footwork’ involved in a classic rollout. The Systems
Management Server first alerts each SMS client of an applicable update. After
acceptance by the user, the SMS client then installs the update. Systems
Management Server can install single files, applications or operating systems
[Microsoft2].
Through the SMS Software Inventory, an administrator can assess systems
in need of certain updates. Updates can be advertised to single or multiple
users, to a network segment, or to a specific machine. Once a user receives an
advertisement from the SMS client, that user can choose to install the software
immediately or schedule an unattended install. Conventionally, an
administrator would need to visit each computer, log in as a privileged user and
install the software manually. The SMS client acts as a system administrator, so
any user can install advertised software, regardless of privilege.
To prepare a software update for SMS distribution, an administrator
creates a script to automate the installation process on the client system. The
administrator must create a ‘package’ that details the software information and
location for distribution on the network. Multiple distribution points can be
created to alleviate a bottleneck at one server hosting an update for an entire
network. Once the application is hosted on the appropriate distribution points,
and the script and package are created, the administrator may advertise the
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new application to a single user/machine or multiple users/machines. The SMS
client on each appropriate machine then alerts the user that new software is
available for installation [Microsoft2].
Programs may be automatically uninstalled from client machines by SMS.
When a program is no longer needed or when an unattended installation fails,
programs can be uninstalled by the SMS client. Administrators can reduce
installation-scripting errors by using the SMS ‘dry-run’ function. An application
package can be test-installed to determine the integrity of the installation script
and application files [Microsoft2].
5.2.3.3. Diagnostics and Troubleshooting
Application and hardware problems can be diagnosed remotely using
Systems Management Server. An administrator can take full control over the
client computer, send files when needed or chat with the user to gather more
information about a problem with the client computer.
Remote control allows an administrator to view a client system remotely
and issue commands to the client via mouse or keyboard. The remote control
functionality is only accessible to individuals with administrative rights
[Microsoft2].
Administrators can also reboot a remote machine to finish a software
update, or to revive a system that has failed. Administrators can also execute
programs remotely. Using all these features of SMS, an administrator can send
an update in executable form to a client computer, execute the update and
then reboot the machine to finish the installation process [Microsoft2].
In addition to monitoring the health of a single system, SMS permits
administrators to monitor their network’s health. Potential network trouble
includes broken links and bottlenecks. A network can be mapped and
graphically displayed for the administrator. The mapping can show systems
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within a subnet and how subnets connect to form a compete network.
Mapping information can be used to find bottlenecks in traffic patterns or
software distribution paths.
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Appendix A
Terms and Definitions
some definitions adapted from http://www.webopedia.com
Term or
abbreviation
ACK
bootpc
bootps
chargen
CGI
COPS
CRC
DDoS

DHCP
DoS
DOS
echo
ETSU
exec
FIN

Definition
ACKnowledge – A type of TCP/IP packet sent to
acknowledge the host and client are attempting to create a
connection.
A utility that allows a client to receive network information
from a bootp server.
A service that allows clients to network boot using a bootp
server.
A UNIX utility that sends random characters over a network.
Common Gateway Interface – A specification that allows a
server-side executable to accept and manipulate data given
from a web page.
Computer Oracle and Password System - A freeware UNIX
tool that discovers computer system misconfigurations that
pose a risk to system and network security.
Cyclic Redundancy Check – a technique for determining
transmission errors.
Distributed Denial of Service (attack) – an attack launched by
multiple computers against a host that blocks a large
percentage of legitimate network traffic from entering the
host network or system.
Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol – a protocol used for
automatically assigning dynamic IP addresses to network
clients.
Denial of Service – an attack launched by a single computer
against a host that causes a failure in the host that denies
services.
Disk Operating System – a computer operating system
developed by Microsoft prevalent in many computers for
over a decade.
A utility used to display a line of text on a screen.
East Tennessee State University - a regional university located
in Johnson City, Tennessee.
A UNIX command that executes applications.
FINish – a type of TCP/IP packet sent to terminate the
connection between a host and a client.
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finger
FTP
gopher
HTTP
ICMP
IDS

IP
klogin
kshell
LC4
login
mask-request
Nessus
NIS
Nmap
NTFS
OSPF
PUSH
RFC
RIP

A utility used to retrieve information about a remote user.
File Transfer Protocol – a protocol used for transferring files
across the Internet.
A system of organizing information for remote browsing that
predates the World Wide Web.
HyperText Transfer Protocol – The protocol used by the World
Wide Web for transferring data between web servers and
web browsers.
Internet Control Message Protocol – A protocol used for
transmitting error, control and informational messages.
Intrusion Detection System – a system, normally placed at the
entrance of a network, that examines network traffic and logs
packets sent with possible malicious intent.
Internet Protocol – a connectionless protocol used to deliver
packets of information between two, or more, systems on a
network. Paired with the Transport Control Protocol to create
TCP/IP, the main protocol used on the Internet and local area
networks.
A utility used to remotely login to a UNIX machine
A utility used to remotely open a Kerberos remote shell
A Windows tool that audits password strength of Windows user
accounts.
A UNIX command used to sign onto a system.
A remote request for a network mask.
A freeware UNIX tool that scans systems on a network to
discover “well-known” security vulnerabilities.
Network Information Service/Server – A server that
continuously browses a network to discover services and lists
network services for lookup.
A freeware UNIX tool that determines open ports within a
network protocol stack.
New Technology File System – A file system used by Windows
NT machines that increases reliability and security when
compared to FAT.
Open Shortest Path First – a routing protocol that offers a more
efficient method of router intercommunication than the
Routing Information Protocol.
A type of TCP/IP packet that prioritizes the packet.
Request For Comments – Documents submitted to be
considered for Internet standards.
Routing Information Protocol – a protocol used by routers to
exchange internet topography information between routers
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RPC
RST
SATAN
SMB
SMS
SMTP
SNMP
Snort
SQL
SYN
talk
TCP

telnet
TFTP
timestamprequest
traceroute
UDP
UNIX
URG

Remote Procedure Call – a protocol that allows a client to
execute a program on a host
ReSeT – a type of TCP/IP packet that resets the connection
between a client and host.
Security Administrator Tool for Analyzing Networks – the first
well-known, network security scanner.
Server Message Block – a message format used by DOS and
Windows to share files, directories and devices.
Systems Management Server – An application developed by
Microsoft for administering a network from a centralized point.
Simple Mail Transfer Protocol – a protocol used for sending email messages between e-mail servers
Simple Network Management Protocol – a protocol used for
managing networks. Mainly for remote system diagnostics.
A freeware cross-platform “lightweight intrustion detection
system”
Structured Query Language – A language for database data
manipulation.
SYNchronize – A type of TCP/IP packet that synchronizes a
data stream between a client and host.
A UNIX program used to communicate between two
Transport Control Protocol – a connection-based protocol
that enables two system to communicate with streams of
information. Paired with the Internet Protocol to create
TCP/IP, the main protocol used on the Internet and local area
networks.
A program/protocol used to connect and interact with a
remote host to perform operations as if the remote host were
local.
Trivial File Transfer Protocol – A FTP service without security
features that uses the UDP protocol to transfer files between
systems.
A remote request for a timestamp.
A utility that tracks a packet between the client and receiving
host, noting all intermediate systems traversed.
User Datagram Protocol – a connectionless protocol used
mainly in broadcast delivery of packets.
A computer operating system with many variants built for
multi-user, multi-process operation.
URGent – a type of TCP/IP packet that flags the packet as
containing urgent data.
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who
whois
xdmcp

A UNIX program used to list users currently signed into a
system.
A utility used to find information about a domain name or an
IP address.
X Display Manager Control Protocol – used by X terminals to
set up an X session with a remote system.
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Appendix B
nsrparser source code
// --- main.cpp --//
// purpose : this program parses a Nessus .nsr file (or a cat of multiple
//
.nsr files) to return desired statistics. hex edit and remove
//
all 1A entries from files before using.
//
// ---------------// declarations
#pragma warning(disable:4786)
#include <algorithm>
#include <fstream>
#include <iostream>
#include <string>
#include <vector>
using namespace std;

// vector sorting
// file streaming
// user input and screen output streams
// string container
// vector container

// struct declarations
struct SELECTION // a single line of a .nsr file separated into its pieces
{
string
string
string
string
string

strHost;
strPort;
strPlugin;
strSeverity;
strDescription;

// host name/ip
// port number
// plugin number
// warning type
// vulnerability description

};
struct PLUGDESC // plugin number and associated description
{
string
string

strPlugin;
strDescription;

// plugin number
// vulnerability description

};
struct OPERSYS // operating system information gathered from scan
{
string
string
string
string

strHost;
strnmap;
strQueso;
strOS;

// host name/ip
// nmap findings
// queso findings
// host OS (inferred)

strHost;

// host name/ip

};
struct HOST // host names
{
string
};
struct PORTSEV // an open port and its associated occurrences of notes, info and report flags
{
string

strPort;

// port number
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int
int
int

nNOTE;
nINFO;
nREPORT;

// number of information entries
// number of warning entries
// number of vulnerability entries

fstrIn;
fstrOut;
SELCurrent;
pvecHosts;
vecOS;
pvecSEV;
vecPLUGDESC;
pvecPLG;

// default incoming stream
// default outgoing stream
// pointer for NEW SELECTION creation
// pointer for NEW vector<HOST> creation
// operating system information vector
// pointer for NEW vector<PORTSEV> creation
// plugins and associated descriptions vector
// pointer for NEW vector<PLUGDESC>
creation
// main data vector of SELECTIONS

};
//variable declarations
fstream
fstream
SELECTION*
vector<HOST>*
vector<OPERSYS>
vector<PORTSEV>*
vector<PLUGDESC>
vector<PLUGDESC>*
vector<SELECTION>
//function declarations
void
void

vecMainData;
findDescription(string);
findDescription2(string, string);

// finds a part of a description
// finds a part of a description

void

findHoles(string);

void
void
string
void
void
void
void
void
void
string
string
void
void
bool

findPlugin(string, string);
makeSelection(string&);
parseString(string&);
retrieveData();
openPorts(string);
operatingSystems();
outputPlugin();
portInfo();
portVulnerabilities(string, string);
removeSemicolons(string);
returnOS(string);
mainMenu();
uniqueHosts();
vecsort(PORTSEV, PORTSEV);

// finds holes on a specified port
// finds hosts with specific information
// make selection struct from NSR line
// retrieves information from NSR line
// opens and parses file, filling vecMainData
// counts number of host with a port open
// find operating systems for hosts
// outputs list of plugins found to file
// returns port information
// finds all vulnerabilities listed for a port
// removes semicolons from plugin description
// offers user parsing options
// counts unique hosts

// --- main() --//
// -------------void main()
{
cout << ".nsr parser v0.50" << endl;
// load information
retrieveData();
// manipulate information
mainMenu();
cout << "[quit]" << endl;
} // end main
// --- retrieveData() --//
// called by : main
// calls to : makeSelection, operatingSystems
// purpose : opens a file in .nsr format and parses the file, filling vecMainData,
//
a vector of SELECTION objects.
//
// ------------------void retrieveData()
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{
bool
bool
char
PLUGDESC*
string

bBadFile = true;
bFoundValue = false;
cDelimiter = 10;
PTemp;
strFileName = "",
strLine = "",
strTemp = "";
vector<PLUGDESC>::reverse_iterator
iPLG;
vector<SELECTION>::iterator
iSEL;

// bad filename flag
// item found in vector flag
// delimiter for .nsr SELECTION information
// pointer for NEW PLUGDESC creation
// name of file to parse
// a single line of the data file
// string container for temporary information
// vecPLUGDESC iterator
// vecMainData iterator

do
{
// get filename to be used in processing
cout << "[enter name of data file]: ";
cin >> strFileName;
cin.ignore(80, '\n');
// attempt to open the file, ask again on error, continue until acceptable
fstrIn.open(strFileName.c_str());
bBadFile = fstrIn.fail();
if (bBadFile)
{
cout << "!! error - can not find file " << strFileName << endl;
fstrIn.clear();
}
} while (bBadFile);
// get a line of text, and process each line using the hex 0A delimiter
cout << "[processing main data vector] ";
do
{
getline(fstrIn, strLine, cDelimiter);
makeSelection(strLine);
} while (!fstrIn.eof());
cout << " [done @ " << vecMainData.size() << " Nessus entries]" << endl;
// close the file
fstrIn.close();
// create vector of plugin numbers and associated descriptions
cout << "[processing plugin/description vector] ";
for (iSEL = vecMainData.begin(); iSEL != vecMainData.end(); iSEL++)
{
strTemp = (*iSEL).strPlugin;
for (iPLG = vecPLUGDESC.rbegin();
iPLG != vecPLUGDESC.rend() && bFoundValue == false;
iPLG++)
{
if (strTemp == (*iPLG).strPlugin)
{
bFoundValue = true;
}
}
// if value is not found in host vector, add hostname to host vector
if (bFoundValue == false)
{
PTemp = new PLUGDESC;
(*PTemp).strPlugin = (*iSEL).strPlugin;
(*PTemp).strDescription = (*iSEL).strDescription;
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vecPLUGDESC.push_back(*PTemp);
delete PTemp;
}
// reset bFoundValue
bFoundValue = false;
}
cout << " [done @ " << vecPLUGDESC.size() << " Nessus plugins]" << endl;
// fill operating systems vector
cout << "[processing operating system information] ";
operatingSystems();
cout << " [done @ " << vecOS.size() << " OS inferences]" << endl;
} // retrieveData()
// --- makeSelection() --//
// called by: retrieveData
// calls to: parseString
// inputs: strLine - a single line from the data file
// purpose: fill a SELECTION object from a line of the data file
//
// ----------------------void makeSelection(string& strLine)
{
// create a NEW SELECTION
SELCurrent = new SELECTION;
// get host name from first section of data file line
(*SELCurrent).strHost = parseString(strLine);
// check for bogus host name/ip entries, else fill vector
if ((*SELCurrent).strHost == "<empty>")
{
delete SELCurrent;
}
else
{
(*SELCurrent).strPort = parseString(strLine);
(*SELCurrent).strPlugin = parseString(strLine);
(*SELCurrent).strSeverity = parseString(strLine);
(*SELCurrent).strDescription = removeSemicolons(parseString(strLine));
// add the nSelection to vecMainData and destroy SELCurrent
vecMainData.push_back(*SELCurrent);
delete SELCurrent;
}
} //makeStruct()
// --- parseString() --//
// called by: makeSelection
// inputs: strLine - a single line from the data file
// purpose: parses a single line of a .nsr file using the | delimiter
// returns: portion of strLine or <empty> is line is empty
//
// --------------------string parseString(string& strLine)
{

84

int
string

nCol = 0;
strReturn = "";

// column of desired character
// string to return

// return <empty> if the length of strLine = 0
if (strLine.length() == 0)
return ("<empty>");
// find first | in the line, and return the portion of the string before the delimiter
// if no delimiter, return the entire string. trim strLine to remove used portion
nCol = strLine.find_first_of("|");
if (nCol != string::npos)
{
strReturn = strLine.substr(0,nCol);
strLine = strLine.substr(nCol+1, strLine.length() - nCol);
}
else
{
strReturn = strLine;
strLine = "";
}
return strReturn;
} // parseString()
// --- removeSemicolons() --//
// called by: makeSelection
// inputs: strLine - description returned from plugin
// purpose: replaces ; from plugin descriptions with newline characters for easier output
// returns: strTemp - the plugin description with replaced ;
//
// -------------------------string removeSemicolons(string strLine)
{
int
string

nCol = 0;
strTemp = "";

// column of desired character
// string container for temporary information

// if no ; exist, return
if (strLine.find_first_of(";") == string::npos)
{
return (strLine);
}
// loop until no ; remain
do
{
nCol = strLine.find_first_of(";");
//change the next line to choose the ; replacement
strTemp = strTemp + strLine.substr(0, nCol) + "\n";
strLine = strLine.substr(nCol+1, strLine.length() - nCol);
} while (strLine.find_first_of(";") != string::npos);
strTemp = strTemp + strLine;
return (strTemp);
} // removeSemicolons()
// --- operatingSystems() --//
// called by: retrieveData
// purpose: infer operating system of host from information gathered during the scan
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//
// -------------------------void operatingSystems()
{
bool

bFoundValue = false;

// host found in vector flag

// operating system clues found in nmap and queso plugins
const char*
aix = "AIX";
const char*
cisco = "Cisco";
const char*
early = "NT4 / Win95 / Win98";
const char*
early2 = "95/98/NT";
const char*
hpux = "HP-UX";
const char*
irix = "Irix";
const char*
irix2 = "IRIX";
const char*
linux = "Linux";
const char*
ljet1 = "LaserJet";
const char*
ljet2 = "JETdirect";
const char*
ljet3 = "JetDirect";
const char*
ltx
= "Lantronix";
const char*
mac
= "Mac";
const char*
me = "Me";
const char*
me2 = "Millenium";
const char*
nov = "Novell";
const char*
nts = "NT 4.0 Server";
const char*
sol = "Solaris";
const char*
three1 = "3Com";
const char*
three2 = "3COM";
const char*
un = "UNIX";
const char*
vms = "VMS";
const char*
wnt = "WindowsNT";
const char*
w2k = "Windows 2000";
const char*
w2ks = "Advance Server";
const char*
w31 = "3.11";
const char*
xp = "XP";
OPERSYS*
string

OTemp;
// pointer for NEW OPERSYS objects
strnmap = "",
strQueso = "",
// OS information findings
strTemp = "";
// string container for temporary information
string
NMAP_PLUGIN_NUMBER = "10336";
// plugin number for nmap OS information
string
QUESO_PLUGIN_NUMBER = "10337";
// plugin number for queso OS information
vector<OPERSYS>::reverse_iterator iOS;
// vecOS iterator
vector<SELECTION>::iterator
iSEL;
// vecMainData iterator
// crawl main data vector for hostnames
for(iSEL = vecMainData.begin(); iSEL != vecMainData.end(); iSEL++)
{
// get plugin number
strTemp = (*iSEL).strPlugin;
// compare plugin numbers
if ((strTemp == NMAP_PLUGIN_NUMBER) || (strTemp == QUESO_PLUGIN_NUMBER))
{
// check host vector for hostname found in vecMainData
// reverse iterator chosen for "rule of proximity"
for(iOS = vecOS.rbegin();
iOS != vecOS.rend() && bFoundValue == false;
iOS++)
{
// if hostname is already listed in vecOS, add new data to vecOS
if ((*iSEL).strHost == (*iOS).strHost)
{
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bFoundValue = true;
if ((*iSEL).strPlugin == NMAP_PLUGIN_NUMBER)
(*iOS).strnmap = (*iSEL).strDescription;
else
(*iOS).strQueso = (*iSEL).strDescription;
}
}
// if value is not found in host vector, add hostname to host vector
if (bFoundValue == false)
{
OTemp = new OPERSYS;
(*OTemp).strHost = (*iSEL).strHost;
(*OTemp).strnmap = "<empty>";
(*OTemp).strQueso = "<empty>";
(*OTemp).strOS = "<no information>";
if ((*iSEL).strPlugin == NMAP_PLUGIN_NUMBER)
(*OTemp).strnmap = (*iSEL).strDescription;
else
(*OTemp).strQueso = (*iSEL).strDescription;
(vecOS).push_back(*OTemp);
delete OTemp;
}
// reset bFoundValue
bFoundValue = false;
}
}
// attempt to determine OS from nmap and queso findings and update vecOS
for (iOS = vecOS.rbegin(); iOS != vecOS.rend(); iOS++)
{
strnmap = (*iOS).strnmap;
strQueso = (*iOS).strQueso;
if ((strnmap.find(sol) != string::npos) && (strQueso.find(sol) != string::npos))
(*iOS).strOS = "Solaris";
else if ((strnmap.find(w2ks) != string::npos) && (strQueso.find(wnt) != string::npos))
(*iOS).strOS = "Windows 2000 Server";
else if ((strnmap.find(w2k) != string::npos) && (strQueso.find(wnt) != string::npos))
(*iOS).strOS = "Windows 2000 Professional";
else if ((strnmap.find(nts) != string::npos) && (strQueso.find(wnt) != string::npos))
(*iOS).strOS = "Windows NT4 Server";
else if ((strnmap.find(early) != string::npos) && (strQueso.find(wnt) != string::npos))
(*iOS).strOS = "Windows NT4 Workstation";
else if ((strnmap.find(early) != string::npos) && (strQueso.find(early2) != string::npos))
(*iOS).strOS = "Windows 95 or 98";
else if ((strnmap.find(cisco) != string::npos) && (strQueso.find(cisco) != string::npos))
(*iOS).strOS = "Cisco IOS";
else if (strnmap.find(me2) != string::npos)
(*iOS).strOS = "Windows Millennium Edition";
else if (strnmap.find(w31) != string::npos)
(*iOS).strOS = "Windows for Workgroups v3.11";
else if ((strnmap.find(ljet1) != string::npos) || (strQueso.find(ljet2) != string::npos) || (strnmap.find(ljet3)
!= string::npos))
(*iOS).strOS = "HP JetDirect Printer";
else if ((strnmap.find(xp) != string::npos) || (strQueso.find(xp) != string::npos))
(*iOS).strOS = "Windows XP";
else if ((strnmap.find(nov) != string::npos) || (strQueso.find(nov) != string::npos))
(*iOS).strOS = "Novell Netware";
else if ((strnmap.find(three1) != string::npos) || (strQueso.find(three2) != string::npos))
(*iOS).strOS = "3Com Device";
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else if ((strnmap.find(hpux) != string::npos) || (strQueso.find(hpux) != string::npos))
(*iOS).strOS = "HP-UX";
else if ((strnmap.find(linux) != string::npos) || (strQueso.find(linux) != string::npos))
(*iOS).strOS = "Linux";
else if ((strnmap.find(irix) != string::npos) || (strQueso.find(irix2) != string::npos))
(*iOS).strOS = "Irix";
else if ((strnmap.find(aix) != string::npos) || (strQueso.find(aix) != string::npos))
(*iOS).strOS = "AIX";
else if ((strnmap.find(vms) != string::npos) || (strQueso.find(vms) != string::npos))
(*iOS).strOS = "VMS";
else if ((strnmap.find(mac) != string::npos) || (strQueso.find(mac) != string::npos))
(*iOS).strOS = "MacOS";
else if ((strnmap.find(un) != string::npos) || (strQueso.find(un) != string::npos))
(*iOS).strOS = "[?]UNIX";
else if ((strnmap.find(w2k) != string::npos) && (strnmap.find(me) != string::npos))
(*iOS).strOS = "[?]Windows 2000 Professional";
else if (strnmap.find(w2ks) != string::npos)
(*iOS).strOS = "[?]Windows 2000 Server";
else if (strnmap.find(nts) != string::npos)
(*iOS).strOS = "[?]Windows NT4 Server";
else if (strQueso.find(wnt) != string::npos)
(*iOS).strOS = "[?]Windows NT4 Workstation / Server / Cisco IOS";
else if ((strnmap.find(early) != string::npos) || (strQueso.find(early2) != string::npos) ||
(strnmap.find(early2) != string::npos))
(*iOS).strOS = "[?]Windows 95 / 98 / NT4";
else
{
(*iOS).strOS = "<unknown>";
}
}
} // operatingSystems()
// --- mainMenu() --//
// called by: main
// purpose: main menu for program. switch on users choice.
//
// -----------------void mainMenu()
{
bool
bGoodValue = false;
char
YN = 'n';
int
nSelection;
string
strInfo;
string
strInfo2;
vector<PLUGDESC>::iterator iPLG;

// acceptable menu selection flag
// yes/no answer
// menu choice of user
// user given information
// user given information
// vecPLUGDESC iterator

// loop until quit
do
{
//loop until acceptable choice
do
{
// reset yes/no flag
YN = 'n';
cout << endl << "[main menu]" << endl << endl;
cout << " [ 1] hosts by name" << endl;
cout << " [ 2] hosts by single port" << endl;
cout << " [ 3] hosts by single vulnerability" << endl;
cout << " [ 4] hosts by single port vulnerabilities" << endl;
cout << " [ 5] ports by # vulnerabilities" << endl;
cout << " [ 6] vulnerabilities by single port" << endl;
cout << " [ 7] hosts by description" << endl;
cout << " [ 8] hosts by two descriptions" << endl;
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cout << " [ 9] warnings by single port" << endl;
cout << " [10] notes by single port" << endl;
cout << " [11] hosts by single warning" << endl;
cout << " [12] hosts by single note" << endl;
cout << " [97] output plugin information to file" << endl;
cout << " [98] change information file" << endl;
cout << " [99] quit" << endl;
cout << endl << " [1-10, 98, 99]: ";
cin >> nSelection;
cin.ignore(80, '\n');
if (((nSelection >= 1) && (nSelection <= 12)) || ((nSelection >= 97) && (nSelection <= 99)))
bGoodValue = true;
if (bGoodValue == false)
cout << endl << "!! error - invalid menu choice" << endl << endl;
} while (bGoodValue == false);
switch(nSelection)
{
case 1:
uniqueHosts();
break;
case 2:
cout << endl << "[enter port number to search for] : ";
cin >> strInfo;
cin.ignore(80, '\n');
cout << endl;
openPorts(strInfo);
break;
case 3:
cout << endl << "[enter plugin number to search for] : ";
cin >> strInfo;
cin.ignore(80, '\n');
cout << endl;
for (iPLG = vecPLUGDESC.begin(); iPLG != vecPLUGDESC.end(); iPLG++)
{
if ((*iPLG).strPlugin == strInfo)
{
cout << endl << (*iPLG).strDescription << endl;
cout << endl << "[find this information/vulnerability (y/n)] : ";
cin >> YN;
cout << endl;
cin.ignore(80, '\n');
if (YN == 'y')
{
findPlugin(strInfo, "REPORT");
break;
}
else
{
cout << endl <<"!! error - user intervention" << endl;
break;
}
}
if (YN == 'y')
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break;
}
if (YN == 'y')
break;
cout << "!! error - plugin not found" << endl << endl;
break;
case 4:
cout << endl << "[enter port number to search for] : ";
cin >> strInfo;
cin.ignore(80, '\n');
cout << endl;
findHoles(strInfo);
break;
case 5:
portInfo();
break;
case 6:
cout << endl << "[enter port number to search for] : ";
cin >> strInfo;
cin.ignore(80, '\n');
cout << endl;
portVulnerabilities(strInfo, "REPORT");
break;
case 7:
cout << endl << "[enter description string] : ";
cin >> strInfo;
cout << endl;
findDescription(strInfo);
cin.ignore(80, '\n');
break;
case 8:
cout << endl << "[enter description string 1] : ";
cin >> strInfo;
cout << endl;
cout << endl << "[enter description string 2] : ";
cin >> strInfo2;
cout << endl;
findDescription2(strInfo, strInfo2);
cin.ignore(80, '\n');
break;
case 9:
cout << endl << "[enter port number to search for] : ";
cin >> strInfo;
cin.ignore(80, '\n');
cout << endl;
portVulnerabilities(strInfo, "INFO");
break;
case 10:
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cout << endl << "[enter port number to search for] : ";
cin >> strInfo;
cin.ignore(80, '\n');
cout << endl;
portVulnerabilities(strInfo, "NOTE");
break;
case 11:
cout << endl << "[enter plugin number to search for] : ";
cin >> strInfo;
cin.ignore(80, '\n');
cout << endl;
for (iPLG = vecPLUGDESC.begin(); iPLG != vecPLUGDESC.end(); iPLG++)
{
if ((*iPLG).strPlugin == strInfo)
{
cout << endl << (*iPLG).strDescription << endl;
cout << endl << "[find this information/vulnerability (y/n)] : ";
cin >> YN;
cout << endl;
cin.ignore(80, '\n');
if (YN == 'y')
{
findPlugin(strInfo, "INFO");
break;
}
else
{
cout << endl <<"!! error - user intervention" << endl;
break;
}
}
if (YN == 'y')
break;
}
if (YN == 'y')
break;
cout << "!! error - plugin not found" << endl << endl;
break;
case 12:
cout << endl << "[enter plugin number to search for] : ";
cin >> strInfo;
cin.ignore(80, '\n');
cout << endl;
for (iPLG = vecPLUGDESC.begin(); iPLG != vecPLUGDESC.end(); iPLG++)
{
if ((*iPLG).strPlugin == strInfo)
{
cout << endl << (*iPLG).strDescription << endl;
cout << endl << "[find this information/vulnerability (y/n)] : ";
cin >> YN;
cout << endl;
cin.ignore(80, '\n');
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if (YN == 'y')
{
findPlugin(strInfo, "NOTE");
break;
}
else
{
cout << endl <<"!! error - user intervention" << endl;
break;
}
}
if (YN == 'y')
break;
}
if (YN == 'y')
break;
cout << "!! error - plugin not found" << endl << endl;
break;
case 97:
outputPlugin();
break;
case 98:
cout << endl;
fstrIn.clear();
vecMainData.clear();
retrieveData();
break;
case 99:
break;
default:
break;
} // switch
bGoodValue = false;
} while (nSelection != 99);
} // mainMenu()
// -- uniqueHosts() -//
// ------------------void uniqueHosts()
{
bool
HOST*
string

bFoundValue = false;
HTemp;
strTemp;

pvecHosts = new vector<HOST>;
vector<SELECTION>::iterator iSEL;
vector<HOST>::reverse_iterator iHOST;
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// value found flag
// temporary host
// temporary string container

// crawl main data vector for hostnames
for(iSEL = vecMainData.begin(); iSEL != vecMainData.end(); iSEL++)
{
strTemp = (*iSEL).strHost;
// check host vector for hostname found in vecMainData
// reverse iterator chosen for "rule of proximity"
for(iHOST = (*pvecHosts).rbegin();
iHOST != (*pvecHosts).rend() && bFoundValue == false;
iHOST++)
{
if (strTemp == (*iHOST).strHost)
{
bFoundValue = true;
}
}
// if value is not found in host vector, add hostname to host vector
if (bFoundValue == false)
{
HTemp = new HOST;
(*HTemp).strHost = (*iSEL).strHost;
(*pvecHosts).push_back(*HTemp);
delete HTemp;
}
// reset bFoundValue
bFoundValue = false;
}
// output
cout << endl << "<list>" << endl;
for(iHOST = (*pvecHosts).rbegin(); iHOST != (*pvecHosts).rend(); iHOST++)
{
cout << (*iHOST).strHost;
cout << ": (";
cout << returnOS((*iHOST).strHost);
cout << ")" << endl;
}
cout << "</list>" << endl;
cout << endl << "[done @ " << (*pvecHosts).size() << " hosts]" << endl << endl;
delete pvecHosts;
} // uniqueHosts
// --- openPorts() --//
// ------------------void openPorts(string strPortNumber)
{
bool
HOST*
int

bFoundValue = false;
HTemp;
nCol1, nCol2;
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// value found flag
// temporary host
// delimiter columns

string

strTemp;

// temporary string container

pvecHosts = new vector<HOST>;
vector<SELECTION>::iterator iSEL;
vector<HOST>::reverse_iterator iHOST;
// crawl main data vector for hostnames
for(iSEL = vecMainData.begin(); iSEL != vecMainData.end(); iSEL++)
{
// get port number
strTemp = (*iSEL).strPort;
nCol1 = strTemp.find_first_of("(");
nCol2 = strTemp.find_first_of("/");
strTemp = strTemp.substr(nCol1 + 1, nCol2 - nCol1 - 1);
// compare port numbers
if (strTemp == strPortNumber)
{
// check host vector for hostname found in vecMainData
// reverse iterator chosen for "rule of proximity"
for(iHOST = (*pvecHosts).rbegin();
iHOST != (*pvecHosts).rend() && bFoundValue == false;
iHOST++)
{
if ((*iSEL).strHost == (*iHOST).strHost)
{
bFoundValue = true;
}
}
// if value is not found in host vector, add hostname to host vector
if (bFoundValue == false)
{
HTemp = new HOST;
(*HTemp).strHost = (*iSEL).strHost;
(*pvecHosts).push_back(*HTemp);
delete HTemp;
}
// reset bFoundValue
bFoundValue = false;
}
}
// output
cout << endl << "<list>" << endl;
for(iHOST = (*pvecHosts).rbegin(); iHOST != (*pvecHosts).rend(); iHOST++)
{
cout << (*iHOST).strHost;
cout << ": (";
cout << returnOS((*iHOST).strHost);
cout << ")" << endl;
}
cout << "</list>" << endl;
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cout << endl << "[done @ " << (*pvecHosts).size() << " systems with port "
<< strPortNumber << " open]" << endl << endl;
delete pvecHosts;
} // openPorts()
// --- findPlugin() --//
// -------------------void findPlugin(string strPluginNumber, string strType)
{
bool
HOST*
string

bFoundValue = false;
HTemp;
strTemp;

// value found flag
// temporary host
// temporary string container

pvecHosts = new vector<HOST>;
vector<SELECTION>::iterator iSEL;
vector<HOST>::reverse_iterator iHOST;
// crawl main data vector for hostnames
for(iSEL = vecMainData.begin(); iSEL != vecMainData.end(); iSEL++)
{
// get port number
strTemp = (*iSEL).strPlugin;
// compare port numbers
if ((strTemp == strPluginNumber) && ((*iSEL).strSeverity == strType))
{
// check host vector for hostname found in vecMainData
// reverse iterator chosen for "rule of proximity"
for(iHOST = (*pvecHosts).rbegin();
iHOST != (*pvecHosts).rend() && bFoundValue == false;
iHOST++)
{
if ((*iSEL).strHost == (*iHOST).strHost)
{
bFoundValue = true;
}
}
// if value is not found in host vector, add hostname to host vector
if (bFoundValue == false)
{
HTemp = new HOST;
(*HTemp).strHost = (*iSEL).strHost;
(*pvecHosts).push_back(*HTemp);
delete HTemp;
}
// reset bFoundValue
bFoundValue = false;
}
}

95

// output
cout << endl << "<list>" << endl;
for(iHOST = (*pvecHosts).rbegin(); iHOST != (*pvecHosts).rend(); iHOST++)
{
cout << (*iHOST).strHost;
cout << ": (";
cout << returnOS((*iHOST).strHost);
cout << ")" << endl;
}
cout << "</list>" << endl;
cout << endl << "[done @ " << (*pvecHosts).size() << " systems with specified "
<< "information plugin " << strPluginNumber << "]" << endl << endl;
delete pvecHosts;
} // findPlugin
// --- findHoles() --//
// ------------------void findHoles(string strPortNumber)
{
bool
HOST*
int
string

bFoundValue = false;
HTemp;
nCol1, nCol2;
strTemp;

// value found flag
// temporary host
// delimiter columns
// temporary string container

pvecHosts = new vector<HOST>;
vector<SELECTION>::iterator iSEL;
vector<HOST>::reverse_iterator iHOST;
// crawl main data vector for hostnames
for(iSEL = vecMainData.begin(); iSEL != vecMainData.end(); iSEL++)
{
// get port number
strTemp = (*iSEL).strPort;
nCol1 = strTemp.find_first_of("(");
nCol2 = strTemp.find_first_of("/");
strTemp = strTemp.substr(nCol1 + 1, nCol2 - nCol1 - 1);
// compare port numbers
if (strTemp == strPortNumber)
{
if ((*iSEL).strSeverity == "REPORT")
{
// check host vector for hostname found in vecMainData
// reverse iterator chosen for "rule of proximity"
for(iHOST = (*pvecHosts).rbegin();
iHOST != (*pvecHosts).rend() && bFoundValue == false;
iHOST++)
{
if ((*iSEL).strHost == (*iHOST).strHost)
{
bFoundValue = true;
}
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}
// if value is not found in host vector, add hostname to host vector
if (bFoundValue == false)
{
HTemp = new HOST;
(*HTemp).strHost = (*iSEL).strHost;
(*pvecHosts).push_back(*HTemp);
delete HTemp;
}
// reset bFoundValue
bFoundValue = false;
}
}
}
// output
cout << endl << "<list>" << endl;
for(iHOST = (*pvecHosts).rbegin(); iHOST != (*pvecHosts).rend(); iHOST++)
{
cout << (*iHOST).strHost;
cout << ": (";
cout << returnOS((*iHOST).strHost);
cout << ")" << endl;
}
cout << "</list>" << endl;
cout << endl << "[done @ " << (*pvecHosts).size() << " systems with vulnerabilities "
<< "on port " << strPortNumber << "]" << endl << endl;
delete pvecHosts;
} // findHoles

// --- portInfo() --//
// -----------------void portInfo()
{
bool
PORTSEV*
int
int
string

bFoundValue = false;
PTemp;
nCol1, nCol2;
INF = 0,
NOT = 0,
REP = 0;
strTemp;

// value found flag
// temporary host
// delimiter columns
// counters
// temporary string container

pvecSEV = new vector<PORTSEV>;
vector<SELECTION>::iterator iSEL;
vector<PORTSEV>::reverse_iterator iSEV;
// crawl main data vector for hostnames
for(iSEL = vecMainData.begin(); iSEL != vecMainData.end(); iSEL++)

97

{
// get port number
strTemp = (*iSEL).strPort;
nCol1 = strTemp.find_first_of("(");
nCol2 = strTemp.find_first_of("/");
strTemp = strTemp.substr(nCol1 + 1, nCol2 - nCol1 - 1);
// check severity vector for port found in vecMainData
// reverse iterator chosen for "rule of proximity"
for(iSEV = (*pvecSEV).rbegin();
iSEV != (*pvecSEV).rend() && bFoundValue == false;
iSEV++)
{
if ((*iSEL).strPort == (*iSEV).strPort)
{
if ((*iSEL).strSeverity == "NOTE")
(*iSEV).nNOTE++;
if ((*iSEL).strSeverity == "INFO")
(*iSEV).nINFO++;
if ((*iSEL).strSeverity == "REPORT")
(*iSEV).nREPORT++;
bFoundValue = true;
}
}
// if value is not found in severity vector, add port number to severity vector
if (bFoundValue == false)
{
PTemp = new PORTSEV;
(*PTemp).strPort = (*iSEL).strPort;
(*PTemp).nINFO = 0;
(*PTemp).nNOTE = 0;
(*PTemp).nREPORT = 0;
if ((*iSEL).strSeverity == "NOTE")
(*PTemp).nNOTE++;
if ((*iSEL).strSeverity == "INFO")
(*PTemp).nINFO++;
if ((*iSEL).strSeverity == "REPORT")
(*PTemp).nREPORT++;
(*pvecSEV).push_back(*PTemp);
delete PTemp;
}
// reset bFoundValue
bFoundValue = false;
}
// output
char
char

c;
lclFileName[100];

do
{
cout << endl << "[print to *S*creen or *F*ile] : ";
cin >> c;
cin.ignore(80, '\n');
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// file name to output to

cout << endl;
} while (c != 'S' && c != 's' && c != 'F' && c != 'f');
sort ((*pvecSEV).rbegin(), (*pvecSEV).rend(), vecsort);
if (c == 'S' || c == 's')
{
cout << endl << "<list>" << endl;
for(iSEV = (*pvecSEV).rbegin(); iSEV != (*pvecSEV).rend(); iSEV++)
{
cout << (*iSEV).strPort << " Vulnerabilities: " << (*iSEV).nREPORT
<< " | Warnings: " << (*iSEV).nINFO << " | Notes: "
<< (*iSEV).nNOTE << endl;
NOT = NOT + (*iSEV).nNOTE;
INF = INF + (*iSEV).nINFO;
REP = REP + (*iSEV).nREPORT;
};
cout << "</list>" << endl;
cout << endl << "[done @ " << (*pvecSEV).size() << " unique ports open]" << endl
<< "[ " << REP << " vulnerabilities, " << INF << " warnings, "
<< NOT << " notes ]" << endl;
}
else
{
cout << "[enter filename for report] : ";
cin >> lclFileName;
cin.ignore(80, '\n');
cout << endl;
fstrOut.open(lclFileName, ios::out);
fstrOut << "<list>\n";
for(iSEV = (*pvecSEV).rbegin(); iSEV != (*pvecSEV).rend(); iSEV++)
{
fstrOut << (*iSEV).strPort << " Vulnerabilities: " << (*iSEV).nREPORT
<< " | Warnings: " << (*iSEV).nINFO << " | Notes: "
<< (*iSEV).nNOTE << "\n";
NOT = NOT + (*iSEV).nNOTE;
INF = INF + (*iSEV).nINFO;
REP = REP + (*iSEV).nREPORT;
};
fstrOut << "</list>\n\n";
fstrOut << "[done @ " << (*pvecSEV).size() << " unique ports open]\n"
<< "[ " << REP << " vulnerabilities, " << INF << " warnings, "
<< NOT << " notes ]\n";
fstrOut.close();
}
delete pvecSEV;
} // portInfo
bool vecsort(PORTSEV p1, PORTSEV p2)
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{
if (p1.nREPORT != p2.nREPORT)
return p1.nREPORT > p2.nREPORT;
else if (p1.nINFO != p2.nREPORT)
return p1.nINFO > p2.nINFO;
else
return p1.nNOTE > p2.nNOTE;
}
// --- outputPlugin() --//
// ---------------------void outputPlugin()
{
char
vector<PLUGDESC>::iterator iPLG;

lclFileName[100];

// file name to output to
// iterator for PLUGDESC vector

cout << endl << "[enter filename for report] : ";
cin >> lclFileName;
cin.ignore(80, '\n');
cout << endl;
fstrOut.open(lclFileName, ios::out);
for (iPLG = vecPLUGDESC.begin(); iPLG != vecPLUGDESC.end(); iPLG++)
{
fstrOut << "\n>>>>>[" << (*iPLG).strPlugin << "]" << endl;
fstrOut << (*iPLG).strDescription << "]" << endl;
}
fstrOut.close();
} // outputPlugin()
// --- portVulnerabilities --//
// --------------------------void portVulnerabilities(string strPortNumber, string strType)
{
bool
PLUGDESC*
int
string

bFoundValue = false;
PTemp;
nCol1, nCol2;
strTemp, strTemp2;

// value found flag
// temporary host
// delimiter columns
// temporary string container

pvecPLG = new vector<PLUGDESC>;
vector<SELECTION>::iterator iSEL;
vector<PLUGDESC>::reverse_iterator iPLG;
// crawl main data vector for hostnames
for(iSEL = vecMainData.begin(); iSEL != vecMainData.end(); iSEL++)
{
// get port number
strTemp = (*iSEL).strPort;
nCol1 = strTemp.find_first_of("(");
nCol2 = strTemp.find_first_of("/");
strTemp = strTemp.substr(nCol1 + 1, nCol2 - nCol1 - 1);
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strTemp2 = (*iSEL).strSeverity;
// compare port numbers
if (strTemp == strPortNumber && strTemp2 == strType)
{
// find plugin in plugin vector
for(iPLG = (*pvecPLG).rbegin();
iPLG != (*pvecPLG).rend() && bFoundValue == false;
iPLG++)
{
if ((*iSEL).strPlugin == (*iPLG).strPlugin)
{
bFoundValue = true;
}
}
// if value is not found in host vector, add hostname to host vector
if (bFoundValue == false)
{
PTemp = new PLUGDESC;
(*PTemp).strPlugin = (*iSEL).strPlugin;
(*PTemp).strDescription = (*iSEL).strDescription;
(*pvecPLG).push_back(*PTemp);
delete PTemp;
}
// reset bFoundValue
bFoundValue = false;
}
}
// output
cout << endl << "<list>" << endl;
for(iPLG = (*pvecPLG).rbegin(); iPLG != (*pvecPLG).rend(); iPLG++)
{
cout << (*iPLG).strPlugin << endl;
}
cout << "</list>" << endl;
cout << endl << "[done @ " << (*pvecPLG).size() << " vulnerabilities on port "
<< strPortNumber << "]" << endl << endl;
delete pvecPLG;
} // portVulnerabilities
// --- returnOS --//
// ---------------string returnOS(string strHost)
{
bool
bFoundValue = false;
vector<OPERSYS>::iterator iOS;
for (iOS = vecOS.begin(); iOS != vecOS.end() && bFoundValue == false; iOS++)
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{
if ((*iOS).strHost == strHost)
return (*iOS).strOS;
}
return ("<no information>");
}
//
void findDescription(string strDescription)
{
bool
HOST*
string

bFoundValue = false;
HTemp;
strTemp;

// value found flag
// temporary host
// temporary string container

pvecHosts = new vector<HOST>;
vector<SELECTION>::iterator iSEL;
vector<HOST>::reverse_iterator iHOST;
// crawl main data vector for hostnames
for(iSEL = vecMainData.begin(); iSEL != vecMainData.end(); iSEL++)
{
// get port number
strTemp = (*iSEL).strDescription;
// compare port numbers
if (strTemp.find(strDescription) != string::npos)
{
// check host vector for hostname found in vecMainData
// reverse iterator chosen for "rule of proximity"
for(iHOST = (*pvecHosts).rbegin();
iHOST != (*pvecHosts).rend() && bFoundValue == false;
iHOST++)
{
if ((*iSEL).strHost == (*iHOST).strHost)
{
bFoundValue = true;
}
}
// if value is not found in host vector, add hostname to host vector
if (bFoundValue == false)
{
HTemp = new HOST;
(*HTemp).strHost = (*iSEL).strHost;
(*pvecHosts).push_back(*HTemp);
delete HTemp;
}
// reset bFoundValue
bFoundValue = false;
}
}
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// output
cout << endl << "<list>" << endl;
for(iHOST = (*pvecHosts).rbegin(); iHOST != (*pvecHosts).rend(); iHOST++)
{
cout << (*iHOST).strHost;
cout << ": (";
cout << returnOS((*iHOST).strHost);
cout << ")" << endl;
}
cout << "</list>" << endl;
cout << endl << "[done @ " << (*pvecHosts).size() << " systems with specified "
<< "description: " << strDescription << "]" << endl << endl;
delete pvecHosts;
}
//
void findDescription2(string strInfo, string strInfo2)
{
bool
HOST*
string

bFoundValue = false;
HTemp;
strTemp;

// value found flag
// temporary host
// temporary string container

pvecHosts = new vector<HOST>;
vector<HOST>
vecBoth;
vector<SELECTION>::iterator iSEL;
vector<HOST>::reverse_iterator iHOST;
// crawl main data vector for hostnames
for(iSEL = vecMainData.begin(); iSEL != vecMainData.end(); iSEL++)
{
// get port number
strTemp = (*iSEL).strDescription;
// compare port numbers
if (strTemp.find(strInfo) != string::npos)
{
// check host vector for hostname found in vecMainData
// reverse iterator chosen for "rule of proximity"
for(iHOST = (*pvecHosts).rbegin();
iHOST != (*pvecHosts).rend() && bFoundValue == false;
iHOST++)
{
if ((*iSEL).strHost == (*iHOST).strHost)
{
bFoundValue = true;
}
}
// if value is not found in host vector, add hostname to host vector
if (bFoundValue == false)
{
HTemp = new HOST;
(*HTemp).strHost = (*iSEL).strHost;
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(*pvecHosts).push_back(*HTemp);
delete HTemp;
}
// reset bFoundValue
bFoundValue = false;
}
}
for(iSEL = vecMainData.begin(); iSEL != vecMainData.end(); iSEL++)
{
// get port number
strTemp = (*iSEL).strDescription;
// compare port numbers
if (strTemp.find(strInfo2) != string::npos)
{
// check host vector for hostname found in vecMainData
// reverse iterator chosen for "rule of proximity"
for(iHOST = (*pvecHosts).rbegin();
iHOST != (*pvecHosts).rend() && bFoundValue == false;
iHOST++)
{
if ((*iSEL).strHost == (*iHOST).strHost)
{
bFoundValue = true;
HTemp = new HOST;
(*HTemp).strHost = (*iSEL).strHost;
(vecBoth).push_back(*HTemp);
delete HTemp;
}
}
// reset bFoundValue
bFoundValue = false;
}
}
// output
cout << endl << "<list>" << endl;
for(iHOST = (vecBoth).rbegin(); iHOST != (vecBoth).rend(); iHOST++)
{
cout << (*iHOST).strHost;
cout << ": (";
cout << returnOS((*iHOST).strHost);
cout << ")" << endl;
}
cout << "</list>" << endl;
cout << endl << "[done @ " << (vecBoth).size() << " systems with specified "
<< "description: " << strInfo << " & " << strInfo2 << "]" << endl << endl;
delete pvecHosts;
}
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